

Dynamic Entry with Cross Product Spillovers: An Application to the Generic Drug Industry*

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Abstract

Experience in one product market can potentially improve firm performance in a related product market in the future. Thus, entry into a market is determined not just by profits in that market but also by its future impact on profitability in other markets. We formulate and estimate a dynamic model of entry decisions of firms in the presence of such spillovers using data on the generic drug industry. Spillovers imply that a firm's unobserved "ability" to profit in a product market not only changes stochastically but is also endogenous to past entry decisions. Therefore, the model needs to accommodate unobserved state variables that are endogenous to firm actions and serially correlated. We address the methodological challenge of estimating such a model using a sequential importance sampling based technique. Our estimates show significant spillover effects of entry on future profits. On average, each entry reduces costs by 7% at the next entry opportunity. On average there are eight entry opportunities annually. The average cumulative benefit of a firm that enters all eight markets in a year is 51%. We conclude that spillovers are critical in the equilibrium evolution of the structure of the generic drug industry.

Keywords: Dynamic Spillovers, Generic Pharmaceuticals, Sequential Importance Sampling, Dynamic Discrete Games, Unobserved Endogenous State Variables, Serial Correlation.

JEL Classification: E00, G12, C51, C52

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1 Introduction

One of the most significant decisions a firm makes is whether or not to introduce a new product. These entry decisions of firms in a forward looking dynamic environment are drastically different from those in a static competitive environment. In a dynamic setting, current entry may have a spillover effect on future entry. This is because a firm's experience in one product market may potential improve its performance in a related product market in the future. Consequently, a firm's decision to enter a product market is determined not just by expected profits in that market but also by the effect of the current entry decision on future profitability in other product markets. In this paper we analyze the dynamic entry decisions of forward looking firms in order to evaluate the effects of current experience on future market performance. In order to do this we formulate and estimate a dynamic game theoretic model of entry decisions of firms in the presence of such cross product spillovers using data on the generic drug industry.

In the case of a generic pharmaceutical firm there can be economies of scope that come from experience working with a particular ingredient, therapeutic class, or form of drug (e.g., oral liquid or liquid injectable). Hence, a firm might enter a particular product market even if the current opportunity is not profitable as long as the spillovers from entry sufficiently improve the discounted stream of cumulative future profits. The model incorporates such dynamic spillovers from experience due to entry on future costs. It allows for serially correlated firm specific costs that evolve endogenously based on past entry decisions. Furthermore, endogeneity of costs to past entry decisions induces heterogeneity among firms even if they are identical ex ante, which they need not be. Starting with innovative work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a), there is a considerable, and growing literature on estimating games of entry (e.g., Berry (1992), Scott-Morton (1999), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), Orhun (2006), Zhu and Singh (2006), Jia (2008), Vitorino (2008)). However, there is almost no research that examines the dynamic spillover effects of entry on future firm performance.

Spillovers imply that a firm's unobserved "ability" to profit in a product market not only changes stochastically but is also is endogenous to past entry decisions. Therefore, the model needs to accommodate unobserved state variables that are endogenous to firm

actions and serially correlated. We address the methodological challenge of estimating such a model using a sequential importance sampling based technique. Although, there have been substantial recent developments in the empirical literature on estimation of dynamic games, incorporating unobserved (to the researcher) state variables that are serially correlated and endogenous remains prohibitively difficult.¹ Our work is related to the seminal paper by Keane (1994) that used sequential importance sampling to develop a computationally feasible simulation based estimator for limited dependent variable panel data models in the presence of serially correlated errors.² A special case of that estimator is the well-known Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) estimator (see e.g., Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud (1996), Geweke and Keane (2001)) that arises for a particular choice of importance sampling densities.

Our paper provides evidence on the dynamic spillover effects of experience in one product market on subsequent performance in the market for another product. In spite of a fairly extensive theoretical literature (see e.g., Spence (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Cabral and Riordan (1994)) on the dynamic strategic effects of past industry experience there is very little empirical examination of such spillovers in a dynamic oligopolistic context. An exception is the work of Benkard (2004) on the role of learning by doing in the aircraft industry.³ Whereas Benkard (2004) focuses on the effects of experience within a particular product we study the cross product effects of experience.

We estimate the model parameters using Bayesian MCMC methods. Our estimates show significant spillover effects of entry on future profits. On average, each entry reduces costs by 7% at the next entry opportunity. On average there are eight entry opportunities annually. The average cumulative benefit of a firm that enters all eight markets in a year is 51%. We

¹See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009) for a recent survey of the literature on dynamic models of strategic interactions. Other excellent surveys of discrete games of entry are Berry and Reiss (2007) and Berry and Tamer (2006).

²Akerberg (2009) has developed a method for using importance sampling coupled with a change of variables technique to provide computational gains in estimating game theoretic and dynamic discrete choice models.

³Our paper differs from Benkard's analysis in two important ways: (i) we allow for the payoffs to be affected by serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables (i.e., firm specific costs). This in turn requires us to (ii) compute and impose the equilibrium conditions of the dynamic game when estimating the spillover effects. In contrast to spillovers within a firm, Xu (2008) examines the spillover effects on a firm's productivity of its competitors' R&D in a dynamic oligopolistic framework using data from the Korean electric motor industry.

conclude that spillovers are critical in the equilibrium evolution of the structure of the generic drug industry. Our methods are more generally applicable to estimating dynamic games in which (i) the choice set is discrete in nature, e.g., entry and exit from industry, expansion or reduction of product categories, introduction of new or discontinuation of old brands, technology adoption or upgrades, relocation, start up or shut down decisions of stores, firms, or factories etc, (ii) when there are serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables, and (iii) an algorithm to solve the game is available.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the related literature in Section 2. Section 3 describes the background and data and Section 4 the model. The method used to solve the model is discussed in Section 5 and the estimation procedure in Section 6. The results are presented in Section 8 and Section 9 concludes.

2 Related Literature

There is a growing literature on the estimation of games. Static games under the incomplete information assumption have been studied by, e.g., Bjorn and Vuong (1984), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991c), Haile, Hortaçsu, and Kosenok (2008), Aradillas-Lopez (2005), Ho (2009), Ishii (2005), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2005), Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2006), Seim (2006), Sweeting (2006), Tamer (2003), Manuszak and Cohen (2004), Rysman (2004), Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004), Ellickson and Misra (2008) and Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2006). Dynamic games of incomplete information have been studied by, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Ryan (2005), Collard-Wexler (2006), Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Nekipelov (2007) and Gowrisankaran, Lucarelli, Schmidt-Dengler, and Town (2008). The literature on estimating games of incomplete information has mostly relied on a two step estimation strategy building on the Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) estimator of Hotz and Miller (1993).

The two step estimation strategy requires the assumption that there is no market or firm level unobserved heterogeneity other than a random shock that is independent and identically distributed across both time and players. This assumption is restrictive because it rules out unobserved dynamics in the latent state variables. It also rules out any private

information that a player might have about competing firms that the researcher does not have. Arcidiacono and Miller (2008) have extended the literature on two step CCP estimation of dynamic discrete models to allow for discrete forms of unobserved heterogeneity using the EM algorithm. In contrast, our method is applicable even when the unobserved variable is continuous. Moreover, while two step methods can be computationally attractive, we think that a likelihood based method, as the one we are employing, has advantages when the model is potentially misspecified. In this case, the likelihood based approach still minimizes a well defined Kullback-Leibler distance between the model and the data. On the other hand, it is not clear whether two step methods minimize a well defined distance between the model and the data if the model is potentially misspecified.

Static games of complete information have been estimated by, e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a), Berry (1992), Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2004). The complete information assumption allows substantial unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firms. These games typically require the use of a combinatorial algorithm to search for an equilibrium instead of the continuous fixed point mapping used in incomplete information models to compute equilibria. To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate a dynamic game of complete information.

In the single agent dynamic framework, there is a considerable amount of research that allows for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, e.g., Keane and Wolpin (1997). With very few exceptions (e.g., Erdem and Keane (1996), Khwaja (2001)), there is almost no work that allows for serially correlated unobserved *endogenous* state variables. Bayesian approaches for single agent dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved state variables that are serially correlated over time have been developed by Imai, Jain, and Ching (2005) and Norets (2009). These papers use MCMC for integrating out the unobserved state variables. In contrast, we use sequential importance sampling to integrate out the unobserved state variables and use MCMC to iterate through the parameter space in estimating the model. In addition we are the first to apply this method to estimate a dynamic game whereas the previous literature has focused on single agent models.

We use MCMC methods in estimating the model. In principle, we could use either frequentist or Bayesian methods in the analysis because an MCMC chain can be used to

compute the statistics that relate to either approach as shown by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). However, our likelihood is nonlinear and is not differentiable making it extremely difficult to compute and to conduct frequentist inference. Conversely, Bayesian inference is both theoretically justified and computationally attractive under these conditions. Moreover, Bayesian methods facilitate use of prior information for identification. Therefore we apply Bayesian methods in the application in this paper.

Our implementation makes use of a sequential importance sampler. Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) used sequential importance sampling methods for estimating macroeconomic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. The structure of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models is closely related to that of dynamic discrete choice models. However, the discrete outcome and game theoretic strategic interaction aspects of our model are novel. Blevins (2008) used the bootstrap filter to allow for serially correlated unobservable state variables in estimating dynamic single agent models, and dynamic games of incomplete information in a revealed preference framework. In a continuous time setting, Nekipelov (2007) developed a flexible indirect inference estimator for continuous time dynamic games in the context of eBay auctions without requiring the complete solution of the dynamic game. This is a novel approach that has potential applications in dynamic oligopolistic competition models.

3 Background and Data

Analysis of consumption and production decisions in the generic pharmaceutical firm industry has been an important topic of empirical research. Generic pharmaceutical sales in the U.S. were valued at \$58.5 billion in 2007. In the same year generics made up 65% of all prescriptions in the U.S. Moreover, in 2007 generic equivalents existed for 8,730 of the 11,487 branded drugs approved by the FDA and listed in its “Orange Book.” In an important paper Scott-Morton (1999) estimated a static entry model to show that entry can be predicted by a firm’s organizational experience, size of the market and whether the entry opportunity is similar to the firm’s existing portfolio of drugs. In subsequent work, Reiffen and Ward (2005) provided evidence on various features of the industry such as: (i) prices of generic drugs fall as the number of competitors increase but remain above long run marginal

costs for less than eight entrants, (ii) greater number of firms enter larger markets, and (iii) profits first increase for early entrants and then decline with more entry.

Crawford and Shum (2005) estimated a dynamic matching model of anti-ulcer drug choice for forward looking consumers. They provided evidence of (i) significant heterogeneity in drug efficacy across individuals and (ii) the benefits of learning from personal experience with drugs in dealing with uncertainty about efficacy. Ching (2010) in an analysis based on a dynamic random utility model of demand for prescription drugs found that after patent expiration (i) the rise in prices of brand name drugs can be explained by heterogeneity in consumer preferences, and (ii) the slow diffusion of generics into the market by consumer learning about product quality. In a companion paper, Ching (2008) developed a finite horizon dynamic⁴ oligopoly model to examine the effect of reducing the approval times for generics. Estimating the model using data on the anti-hypertension drug Clonidine he found that although the policy change reduces the time to entry it also reduces the number of generic entrants in equilibrium as there tends to be greater entry in the early periods which decreases the average profitability of firms. However, much remains to be understood about the generic pharmaceutical industry, especially with regard to the entry decisions of firms and whether past industry experience confers any strategic advantage when firms engage in dynamic oligopolist competition.

In this paper we use the unique data assembled by Scott-Morton (1999) on the entry decisions of generic drug manufacturers from 1984 to 1994.⁵ This time period is particularly interesting because of the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act which lowered barriers to entry for generic firms by permitting Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs). This vastly increased entry in to the generic market as it relaxed the requirements for generic firms to gain FDA approval. Generic firms did not have to repeat all the tests that the manufacturer of the pioneer branded product had undertaken but instead were only required to show that the generic product was bioequivalent and had identical characteristics in strength, dosage form and route. Also in 1989 there was a “generic scandal” in which some FDA reviewers

⁴Ching (2008) focuses on the dynamics of demand and supply over time within a product market. In contrast we focus on the dynamics that come from spillovers across product markets.

⁵We are grateful to Fiona Scott Morton for providing us with her data, and to Derek Gurney for answering our questions about the data.

were caught accepting bribes to expedite ANDAs, and some firms were found to have used the original branded drug in place of their own in the FDA review process. We refer the reader to Scott-Morton (1999) for details of the data set and the institutional environment. We summarize the facts relevant for our study here.

The preparation of an ANDA takes months to years because it requires construction of manufacturing facilities that need to be inspected and approved by the FDA prior to launch of full scale operations. The sunk cost of submitting an ANDA is high even though it is much less than a new drug invention. For example, the average revenues for generic firms in one-firm markets are \$10 million, while the costs of submitting an ANDA can range from \$250,000 to \$20 million (Scott-Morton (1999)). Furthermore, the size and heterogeneity of entry cost relative to the size of market revenue lead to a small number of entrants supported by each market. In addition, the FDA does not reveal when and from whom it receives ANDA applications.

As discussed in Scott-Morton (1999), announced entry is very rare, because firms do not want to signal the common market value. They also fear that the delay in the approval will invite competition. There are few late sequential movers who withdraw in response to rivals' approvals. Simultaneous moves in a dynamic context are an important feature of this industry. These features of the data are consistent with our modeling assumption of a dynamic simultaneous entry game among a small number of competing pharmaceutical firms in which firms have to face substantial competition when they incur the sunk cost of entry.

The original data used by Scott-Morton (1999) consists of all ANDA approvals between 1984 and 1994. There is data on 1,233 ANDAs, and 363 markets entry opportunities for a total of 123 firms. In constructing our estimation sample we use the following information for each market opportunity: ANDA submission date, ANDA approval date, characteristics of drug (i.e., ingredient, concentration, route, form), characteristics of drug markets (i.e., drug therapeutic class, patent expiration date, revenue of brand name drug the year before expiration), characteristics of firms (i.e., parent or subsidiary firm, whether firm was indicted in a bribery scandal).

Based on our model specification and estimation strategy (described below) we only

need information on total market revenues and entry decisions of potential entrants at each market entry opportunity to recover the model parameters. In estimating the model we focus on the period after the FDA bribery scandal in 1989 because of the general upheaval and uncertainty in the generic drug industry surrounding the scandal period. We take great care in processing the data between 1988 to 1993. We only study ANDAs for generic drugs that are orally ingested in the form of pills. Thus, we focus on spillovers from experience in producing drugs in the form of oral solids. In this category, for the sample period 1990-94, there are 40 market openings for which there is no missing revenue information and 51 firms who entered at least once. Each market category is defined as a unique combination of primary ingredient, patent expiration date and total revenue for the branded drug for the last year before patent expiration.⁶ The top ten dominant firms in the sample after 1989 are (in descending order of dominance): Mylan, Novopharm, Lemmon, Geneva, Copley, Roxane, Purepac, Watson, Mutual and Lederle. The top firm, Mylan, entered 45% of the markets, the top two 48%, the top three 55%, the top four 60%, the top five 65%, and the top ten 73%. Individually, Novopharm entered 28%, and Lemmon and Geneva entered 25% of the markets.

In our analysis we consider situations where the potential entrants are the top three or four firms. In each case the remaining firms are combined into a category referred to as “other.” The fraction of the market allocated to “other” is taken as given and is anticipated by the top firms when considering entry. The procedure we use to implement this is described in Section 4. On average 3.3 firms enter a market, with the minimum number of entrants being one and the maximum being nine firms. The mean revenue in thousands of dollars is 126,901, the std. dev. is 161,580, the minimum is 72, and maximum is 614,593. In our estimation we use the log of revenue and in that case the mean is 10.47, std. dev. is 2.1, minimum is 4.3, and maximum is 13.3.

Table 1 about here

⁶Some amount of hand editing was required in constructing the sample, e.g., when the revenue number was different due to rounding error or there was a spelling error in the primary ingredient of the drug.

4 Model

In this section we formally describe the dynamic oligopolistic game of entry. Firms maximize profits over an infinite horizon $t = 1, \dots, \infty$, where each time the market is open counts as one time increment. A market opening is defined to be an entry opportunity that becomes available to generic manufacturers each time a branded product goes off patent. Since a time period uniquely identifies a market opening, in what follows t is used interchangeably to denote a market opening or the time period associated with it. One could also think of the dynamics arising from evolution of demand, revenues and costs for a particular generic product as it diffuses through the market over time (see e.g. Ching (2010)). This would lead to two time indices, one for the sequence of product markets opening over time and the other for profits over time within a product market. For computational feasibility, we abstract from the latter and assume that once a firm enters a market it realizes all the payoffs associated with that product market as a lump sum at the date of entry.

The actions available to firm i when market t opens are to enter, $A_{it} = 1$, or not enter $A_{it} = 0$. Empirically this is determined by whether a firm submits an ANDA or not. There are I firms in total so that the number of entrants in market t is given by

$$N_t = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it} \quad (1)$$

The primary source of dynamics is through costs. The evolution of current costs, C_{it} , is determined by past entry decisions and random shocks. The past entry decisions account for spillovers of past industry experience on production costs in the current entry opportunity. We will follow the standard convention that a lower case quantity denotes the logarithm of an upper case quantity, e.g., $c_{it} = \log(C_{it})$. The log cost of a firm is assumed to follow a stationary autoregressive process of order one. The equation governing the log cost of firm i at market t is

$$c_{it} = \mu_c + \rho_c(c_{i,t-1} - \mu_c) - \kappa_c A_{i,t-1} + \sigma_c e_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where e_{it} is a normally distributed shock with mean zero and unit variance, σ_c is a scale parameter, κ_c is the entry spillover or immediate impact on cost at market t if there was entry in market $t - 1$, μ_c is a location parameter that represents the overall average of the

log cost over a long period of time. The autoregressive parameter ρ_c represents the degree of persistence between the current cost and its long run stationary level. We assume that all firms are ex ante identical, with the effects of current decisions on future costs creating heterogeneity between firms. Hence, none of these parameters are firm specific, i.e., indexed by i . Alternatively put, heterogeneity arises endogenously in the model depending on the past actions of the firms.

We assume, as in Scott-Morton (1999), that all firms observe each others' costs and hence this is a game of complete information. As far as the researcher is concerned the log cost can be decomposed into a sum of two components, a known component (or observable to the researcher based on past actions), $c_{k,i,t}$, and a component unobservable to the researcher, $c_{u,i,t}$, as follows:

$$c_{i,t} = c_{u,i,t} + c_{k,i,t} \quad (3)$$

$$c_{u,i,t} = \mu_c + \rho_c (c_{u,i,t-1} - \mu_c) + \sigma_c e_{it} \quad (4)$$

$$c_{k,i,t} = \rho_c c_{k,i,t-1} - \kappa_c A_{i,t-1} \quad (5)$$

From these equations it is seen that the location parameter μ_c can be interpreted as the stationary long run mean of the unobservable portion of log cost and that the total impact of entry spillover at market t of a firm's past entry decisions is $c_{k,i,t} = -\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho_c^j \kappa_c A_{i,t-j-1}$.

Two implications of the specification in equations (3)-(5) are that irrespective of the calendar time that has elapsed between any two adjacent market openings, (i) cost decreases are of the same magnitude, and (ii) the discount rate is held constant between market openings. These are plausible assumptions for our application as in our estimation sample (described earlier in Section 3) there are 40 openings in the period 1990-94, i.e. on average a market opens every 1.5 months. This convention avoids insurmountable computational difficulties in solving for the equilibrium of the model that would arise if unequal spacing between market openings were assumed. Moreover, with this convention, we are only required to obtain a correct chronological order of the data rather than to determine market entry dates precisely. We order markets according to the date when the first ANDA was received by the FDA for a particular market opportunity.

Our timing convention underlying the dynamic cost process (equation (2)), i.e., each time

period t represents the sequence of market openings and not calendar time, implies that the cost advantage of entry dissipates with additional entry rather than the passage of calendar time. This may happen due to capacity or resource constraints. As the resources required for entry are stretched beyond their limits it may not be possible to expand the pool of resources that can be devoted to additional projects easily. For example, a team that is working on formulating a particular drug or guiding it through the FDA approval process may only be able to work on a small number of projects at a given time and it may not be easy to hire additional members for the team. Furthermore, in view of the excellent fit to the data that we are able to achieve (Section 8 below) this timing convention appears reasonable a posteriori. Also of note is that although we are calling the latent variable “cost” for convenience, it represents any unobserved variable that could have dynamic spillover effects of entry on profits. For example, the underlying sources of the spillover could be supply side factors like learning by doing or economies of scope or for that matter demand side factors like reputation about quality or development of distribution networks. As stated earlier, the spillover effect estimated in this paper pertains to experience gained in producing drugs in the form of oral solids. Quantifying other sources of spillovers is beyond the scope of this paper as it would require expanding the state space leading to computational intractability.

The total (lump sum) revenue to be divided among firms who enter a market at time t is $R_t = \exp(r_t)$, which is realized from the following independent and identical distribution,

$$r_t = \mu_r + \sigma_r e_{I+1,t} , \tag{6}$$

where $e_{I+1,t}$ is normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance. In equation (6), μ_r is a location parameter that reflects the average total revenue for all the firms across all market opportunities, and σ_r is a scale parameter. In our data the measure we have for total revenue is from the last year the brand name drug was on patent. We interpret this value as being exogenously determined solely by the firm manufacturing the branded product prior to the entry decisions of the generic firms, and being proportional to the total discounted value of the revenue flows to generic drugs after patent expiration.

A total of fifty one firms entered the market after the 1989 FDA bribery scandal. Computing a solution to a dynamic game of strategic interactions between fifty one players is not

computationally feasible.⁷ Therefore, we consider only the dominant firms. In the following, N_t is used to denote the number of entering dominant firms. We consider the case of three and four dominant firms. N_t is less than or equal to I , which is the total number of dominant firms (i.e. 3 or 4), which is considered to be time-invariant. N_t is to be differentiated from N_t^a , which is used to denote the total number of entrant firms at time t including both dominant and nondominant firms.

We allow for nondominant firms as follows. Regressions indicate that $\log N_t^a = b \log R_t$, with $b \approx 0.092$, is a reasonable approximation to the total number of firms that enter a market. The idea of this regression dates back to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991c) who showed that there is a close relationship between the number of entrants and the total market revenue. Therefore, when one of the dominant firms is considering entry, it can anticipate that the revenue available to be divided among all dominant firms should be larger than the average revenue available to each of the entering firms, which is $\log R_{\text{anticipated}} \geq \log R - \log N^a = \log R - b \log R = \log (R^{1-b})$. These considerations suggest that a reasonable functional form for dominant firm i 's per period profit at time t is

$$A_{it} (R_t^\gamma / N_t - C_{it}), \quad (7)$$

with $1 - b = 0.908$ being a reasonable lower bound for γ . The upper bound is one.

The firm's total discounted profit at time t is

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j A_{i,t+j} (R_{t+j}^\gamma / N_{t+j} - C_{i,t+j}), \quad (8)$$

where β is the discount factor, $0 < \beta < 1$. The firm's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of its profit at each time period t taking as given the equilibrium action profiles of other firms.

The Bellman equation for the choice specific value function, $V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t)$,

⁷See Benkard, Weintraub, and Roy (2007) for a discussion of the concept of oblivious equilibrium and the associated method to compute the solution to dynamic games when the number of players is very large.

for firm i 's dynamic problem at time t is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) & \tag{9} \\
= A_{it} (R_t^\gamma / N_t - C_{it}) & \\
+ \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(A_{i,t+1}^E, A_{-i,t+1}^E, C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) \mid A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right], &
\end{aligned}$$

where by convention $-i$ represents the other players. The choice specific value function represents the sum of current and future payoffs to firm i from a choice $A_{i,t}$ at time t explicitly conditioning on the choices that would be made by other firms $A_{-i,t}$ at time t and with the expectation that firm i and the other firms would be making equilibrium choices from period $t+1$ onwards conditional on their current choices. The expectations operator here is over the distribution of the state variables in time period $t+1$ conditional on the realization of the time t state variables and the action profile at time t . Therefore $V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t)$ represents the payoff of firm i at stage t of the game.

A stationary pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game is defined by a best response strategy profile $(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E)$ that satisfies

$$V_i(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \geq V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \quad \forall i, t, \tag{10}$$

where $A_{i,t}^E$ is the entry decision of firm i for market t , $A_{-i,t}^E$ the vector of entry decisions of the other dominant firms.

This is a game of complete information. Hence, if the state, which includes the current cost of all firms $(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t})$ and total revenue (R_t) , is known, then the equilibrium is known. Therefore, an ex ante value function can be computed from the choice specific value function

$$V_i(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) = V_i(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t). \tag{11}$$

The ex ante value function satisfies the Bellman equation

$$\begin{aligned}
V_i(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) & \tag{12} \\
= A_{it}^E (R_t^\gamma / N_t^E - C_{it}) + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) \mid A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right], &
\end{aligned}$$

where N_t^E is the number of firms that enter, which can be computed using equation (1), i.e., $N_t^E = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it}^E$. Equation (12) is different from the Bellman equation associated with

the choice specific value function (equation (9)) as it represents the sum of current and future payoffs to firm i from an optimal choice $A_{i,t}^E$ at time t explicitly conditioning on the equilibrium choices that would be made by other firms $A_{-i,t}^E$ at time t , and with the expectation that all firms would be making equilibrium choices from period $t+1$ onwards. In contrast to equation (9), the expectations operator here is over the conditional distribution of the state variables in time period $t+1$ with the value function evaluated at the best response strategy profile.

Reny (1999) demonstrated the complexity of the conditions required to guarantee existence of pure strategy equilibria in games in which payoffs are discontinuous in strategies, as in our case. A comprehensive discussion of several results for existence of equilibria in Markovian games is provided by Dutta and Sundaram (1998). More results on existence of equilibria in dynamic oligopolistic models are to be found in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007). When the state space can only take on a finite set of values, Theorem 3.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) implies that this game has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies. Parthasarathy (1973) showed that this baseline case can be relaxed to include a state space with countable values. The regularity conditions of Theorem 5.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) come closer to the problem as we have posed it, notably that the revenue and cost do not have to be discrete but they do need to be bounded. The equilibrium strategy profiles provided by Theorem 5.1 may depend on periods t and $t-1$ of the state vector.

We could modify our problem to meet the requirements of Theorem 3.1 that the state space be finite and countable. However we rely on Theorem 5.1 instead as we do not have trouble computing pure strategy equilibria for the problem as posed with a continuous state space. Theorem 3.1 is of interest to us because its proof relies on a dynamic programming approach that motivates our computational strategy, discussed below in Section 6 (see also Rust (1996) for a discussion of a similar computation strategy). We find that we can always compute pure strategy equilibria that depend only on period t of the state vector, and hence automatically satisfy the regularity conditions of Theorem 5.1. While the results described above imply that a slightly modified version of the game proposed by us has equilibria, we rely mostly on the fact that we have no difficulty computing equilibria. In fact the key

hurdle we face is not the lack of existence of equilibria but instead multiplicity of equilibria. In Section 6 we discuss how we resolve this problem.

5 Solving the Model

Our estimation strategy is based on a nested approach wherein the solution of the dynamic game is computed for each evaluation of a likelihood function that depends on both observable and latent variables. To compute a likelihood that depends only on observable variables in the data, the latent state variables are integrated out using sequential importance sampling. Using the likelihood that depends only on observable data, an MCMC algorithm generates draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters. The broad outline of the computational strategy is as follows: (1) Generate a parameter value by means of an MCMC algorithm. (2) For that parameter value, generate values for the latent variable over the sample period by means of the importance sampler. (3) Solve the dynamic game to compute the equilibrium outcome as function of the observed and unobserved state variables and the parameter value. (4) Use the equilibrium outcome generated from the solution to compute a likelihood that depends on the observed data and latent state variables (at the given parameter value). (5) Integrate out the latent state variables by averaging the log likelihood over repetitions of the importance sampler to obtain a log likelihood that depends only on observed variables (at the given parameter value).⁸ (6) Use the likelihood that depends only on observed variables to make the accept/reject decision of the MCMC algorithm. Cycling through steps (1) to (6) generates an MCMC chain that is a sample from the posterior distribution of the parameters from which the posterior mean, mode, standard deviation, etc. can be computed.

In this section we describe the method used to solve for the equilibrium of the dynamic game given the observed and latent state variables and a set of parameter values. In Section 6 we describe how the likelihood is computed using the solution of the dynamic game and the MCMC algorithm. Since we use an infinite horizon model we look for a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium which entails finding the fixed point of the Bellman equation (12).

⁸As the name suggests, the sequential importance sampler does this by averaging sequentially as one progresses through the sample rather than storing all latent variable trajectories prior to averaging them.

Let the entry decisions of all $i = 1, \dots, I$ firms for a market opening at time t , i.e., the strategy profile of the dynamic game, be denoted by

$$A_t = (A_{1t}, \dots, A_{It}). \quad (13)$$

As discussed in Section 4, the strategy profile A_t at time t of the dynamic game is a function of the current period state variables (C_{1t}, \dots, C_{It}) and R_t . The vector of the log of the state variables at time t is

$$s_t = (c_{1t}, \dots, c_{It}, r_t). \quad (14)$$

In particular, equations (9) and (12) can be expressed in terms of s_t using $C_{it} = \exp(s_{it})$ for $i = 1, \dots, I$ and $R_t = \exp(s_{I+1,t})$. We describe the solution algorithm for a given parameter vector and a given state s_t at time t .

We begin by defining a grid on the state space which determines a set of $(I + 1)$ -dimensional hyper-cubes. For each hyper-cube we use its centroid as its index or key K . A state s_t within hyper-cube can be mapped to its key K .⁹ Let the vector $V_K(s_t)$ have as its elements the ex ante value functions $V_{i,K}(s_t)$, i.e., $V_K(s_t) = (V_{1,K}(s_t), \dots, V_{I,K}(s_t))$ (see equations (11) and (12)). To each K associate a vector b_K of length I and a matrix B_K of dimension I by $I + 1$. A given state point s_t is mapped to its key K and the value function at state s_t is represented by the affine function $V_K(s_t) = b_K + (B_K)s_t$.¹⁰ A value function $V_K(s_t)$ whose elements satisfy equation (12) is denoted $V_K^*(s_t) = b_K^* + (B_K^*)s_t$.

The game is solved as follows:

1. Given a state point s , get the key K that corresponds to it. (We suppress the subscript t for notational convenience.)¹¹

⁹Grid increments are chosen to be fractional powers of two so that the key has an exact machine representation. This facilitates efficient computation through compact storage of objects indexed by the key. The rounding rules of the machine resolve which key a state on a grid boundary gets mapped to, although lying on a boundary is a probability zero event in principle. The entire grid itself is never computed because all we require is the mapping $s \mapsto K$, which is determined by the increments. The end points of a hyper-cube on the grid in order to find the appropriate key K are computed as needed.

¹⁰Keane and Wolpin (1997) adopt a similar approach for a single agent model. Our approach differs from Keane and Wolpin (1997) in that we let the coefficients of the regression depend on the state variables, specifically the key K , whereas Keane and Wolpin (1997) use an OLS regression whose coefficients are not state specific. Thus, our value function, unlike theirs, need not be continuous. Our value function can be thought of as an approximation by a local linear function.

¹¹In fact, because it is a stationary game, the subscript t does not really matter

2. Check whether the fixed point $V_K^*(s)$ of the Bellman equations (12) at this key has already been computed, i.e., whether the (b_K^*, B_K^*) for the K that corresponds to s has been computed. If not, then use the following steps to compute it.
3. Start with an initial guess of the ex ante value function $V_K^{(0)}(s)$. An initial guess of the value function is represented by the coefficients $(b_K^{(0)}, B_K^{(0)})$ being set to 0.
4. Obtain a set of points s_j , $j = 1, \dots, J$, that are centered around K . The objective now is to obtain the ex ante value functions associated with these points to use in a regression to recompute (or update) the the coefficients $(b_K^{(0)}, B_K^{(0)})$.
5. Ex ante value functions are evaluated at best response strategies. In order to compute these we must, for each s_j , compute the choice specific value function (9) at as many strategy profiles A as are required to determine whether or not the equilibrium condition in equation (10) is satisfied. In this process we need to take expectations to compute the continuation value $\beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_{K,i}^{(0)}(s_{t+1}) \mid A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t, \right]$ that appears in equation (9), where we have used equation (11) to express equation (9) in terms of $V_K^{(0)}(s)$. To compute expectations over the conditional distribution of the random components of next period state variables, we use Gauss-Hermite quadrature. To do this, we obtain another set of points centered around each s_j , i.e., s_{jl} , $l = 1, \dots, L$. These points are the abscissae of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule which are located relative to s_j but shifted by the actions A under consideration to account for the dynamic effects of current actions on future costs (see equation (5)). Expectations are computed using a weighted sum of the value function evaluated at the abscissae (more details are provided below).
6. We can now compute the continuation value at s_j for each candidate strategy A . We compute the best response strategy profile A_j^E corresponding to s_j by checking the Nash equilibrium condition (equation 10). As just described, the choice specific value function evaluated at (A_i^E, s_j) is computed using $V_K^{(0)}(s)$ and equation (9), and denoted by $V_K^{(1)}(A^E, s_j) = (V_{1,K}^{(1)}(A^E, s_j), \dots, V_{I,K}^{(1)}(A^E, s_j))$.

7. Next we use the “data” $(V_K^{(1)}(A^E, s_j), s_j)_{j=1}^J$ to update the ex ante value function to $V_K^{(1)}(s_j)$. This is done by updating the coefficients of its affine representation to $(b_K^{(1)}, B_K^{(1)})$ via a multivariate regression on this “data” (as described in detail below).¹²
8. We iterate (go back to step 5) over the ex ante value functions $V_{i,K}^{(0)}(s), V_{i,K}^{(1)}(s), \dots$ by finding a new equilibrium strategy profile A^E for each s_j until convergence is achieved for the coefficients $(b_K^{(0)}, B_K^{(0)}), (b_K^{(1)}, B_K^{(1)}), \dots, (b_K^{(*)}, B_K^{(*)})$. This gives us $V_K^*(s) = b_K^* + (B_K^*)s$ for every s that maps to key K .

To summarize, the process of solving for the equilibrium begins with a conjecture $(b_K^{(l)} = 0, B_K^{(l)} = 0)$ for the linear approximation of the value functions at a given state at iteration $l = 0$. These guesses are then used in computing the choice specific value functions at iteration $l + 1$ using equation (9). This computation involves taking expectations over the conditional distribution of the future state variables, which is accomplished using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature. Once we have the choice specific value functions we compute the equilibrium strategy profile at iteration $l + 1$ using equation (10). The best response strategy profile at iteration $l + 1$ is then used to compute the iteration $l + 1$ ex ante value functions via a regression that can be viewed as iterating equation (12). The iteration $l + 1$ ex ante value functions are then used to compute the iteration $l + 2$ choice specific value functions using equation (9), and the entire procedure is repeated till a fixed point of equation (12) is obtained. This iterative procedure solves the dynamic game. We next provide additional details about the steps of the algorithm described above to solve the model.

To describe the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure used in Step 5, note that if one conditions upon s_t and A_t , then the elements of s_{t+1} are independently normally distributed with means $\mu_i = \mu_c + \rho_c(c_{it} - \mu_c) - \kappa_c A_{it}$ for the first I elements (see equation 2), mean $\mu_{I+1} = \mu_R$ for the last element (see equation 6), standard deviations $\sigma_i = \sigma_c$ for the first I elements, and standard deviation $\sigma_{I+1} = \sigma_R$ for the last. Computing a conditional expectation of functions of the form $f(s_{t+1})$ given (A_t, s_t) such as appear in equations (9) and (12) is now a matter of integrating with respect to a normal distribution with these means and variances which can be done by a Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule that has been subjected

¹² $V_K^{(1)}(A^E, s_j)$ will not equal $V_K^{(1)}(s_j)$ because the former is “data” and the later is a regression prediction.

to location and scale transformations. The weights w_j and abscissae x_j for Gauss-Hermite quadrature may be obtained from tables such as Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) or by direct computation using algorithms such as Golub and Welsch (1969) as updated in Golub (1973). To integrate with respect to $s_{j,t+1}$ conditional upon A_t and s_t the abscissae are transformed to $\tilde{s}_{t+1,j} = \mu_j + \sqrt{2}\sigma_j x_j$, and the weights are transformed to $\tilde{w}_j = w_j/\sqrt{\pi}$, where $\pi = 3.142$.¹³ Then, using a $2L + 1$ rule,

$$\mathcal{E}[f(s_{t+1}) | A_t, s_t] \approx \sum_{j_1=-L}^L \cdots \sum_{j_I=-L}^L \sum_{j_{I+1}=-L}^L f(\tilde{s}_{t+1,j_1}, \dots, \tilde{s}_{t+1,j_I}, \tilde{s}_{t+1,j_{I+1}}) \tilde{w}_{j_1} \cdots \tilde{w}_{j_I} \tilde{w}_{j_{I+1}}. \quad (15)$$

If, for example, there are three firms and a three point quadrature rule is used, then

$$\mathcal{E}[f(s_{t+1}) | A_t, s_t] \approx \sum_{i=-1}^1 \sum_{j=-1}^1 \sum_{k=-1}^1 \sum_{l=-1}^1 f(\tilde{s}_i, \tilde{s}_j, \tilde{s}_k, \tilde{s}_l) \tilde{w}_i \tilde{w}_j \tilde{w}_k \tilde{w}_l.$$

We use three point rules throughout. A three point rule will integrate a polynomial in s_{t+1} up to degree five exactly.¹⁴

Step 7 involves updating the ex ante value function using a regression. We next describe how we do this. As stated above, we have a grid over the state space whose boundaries are fractional powers of two over the state space.¹⁵ We approximate the value function $V(s_t)$ by a locally indexed affine representation as described above. For the the grid increments that determine the index of hyper-cubes we tried a range of values from 4 to 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables rounded to a nearby fractional power of two to scale the grid appropriately. The results are effectively the same. Hence in estimating the model we set the grid increments at 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables.¹⁶

¹³These transformations arise because a Hermite rule integrates $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) \exp(-x^2) dx$. Hence we need to do a change of variables to get our integral $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(\sigma z + \mu) (1/\sqrt{2\pi}) \exp(-0.5z^2) dz$ to be of that form. A change of variables puts the equation in the line above in the form $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(\sqrt{2}\sigma x + \mu) (1/\sqrt{\pi}) \exp(-x^2) dx$, which is where the expressions for $\tilde{s}_{t+1,i}$ and \tilde{w}_i come from.

¹⁴If the \tilde{s}_{t+1} cross a grid boundary when computing (9) in Step 5, we do not recompute K because this would create an impossible circularity due to the fact that the value function at the new K may not yet be available. Our grid increments are large relative to the scatter of abscissae of the quadrature rule so that crossing a boundary will be a rare event, if it happens at all.

¹⁵Recall that grid increments are chosen to be fractional powers of two so that the key has an exact machine representation. This facilitates efficient computation through compact storage of objects indexed by the key.

¹⁶The set of keys that actually get visited in any MCMC repetition is about the same for grid increments ranging from 4 to 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables in our data. For a three firm game the number of hyper-cubes that actually are visited in any one repetition is about six.

We compute the coefficients b_K and B_K as follows. They are first initialized to zero. We then generate a set of abscissae $\{s_j\}$ clustered about K and solve the game with payoffs (9) to get corresponding equilibria $\{A_j^E\}$. We substitute the (A_j^E, s_j) pairs into equation (9) to get $\{V(A_j^E, s_j)\}_{j=1}^J$. Using the pairs $\{(V(A_j^E, s_j), s_j)\}$ as data, we compute b_K and B_K by multivariate least squares. We repeat until the b_K and B_K stabilize. We have found that approximately twenty iterations suffice for three firms and thirty for four firms.¹⁷ The easiest way to get a cluster of points $\{s_j\}$ about a key is to use abscissae from the quadrature rule described above with s set to K and A set to zero. However, one must jiggle the points so that no two firms have exactly the same cost (see next paragraph for the reason for this). Of importance in reducing computational effort is to avoid recomputing the payoff (equation (9)) when checking equilibrium condition (10). Our strategy is to (temporarily) store payoff vectors indexed by A and check for previously computed payoffs before computing new ones in checking condition (10).

There will, at times, be multiple equilibria in solving the game. We therefore adopt an equilibrium selection rule as follows. Multiple equilibria usually take the form of a situation where one or another firm can profitably enter but if both enter they both will incur losses whereas if neither enters then one of them would have an incentive to deviate. In the three firm game the frequency of multiple equilibria is about 4%. We resolve this situation by assuming an explicit equilibrium selection rule. We pick the equilibrium with the lowest total cost. This idea is similar to that used by Berry (1992) and Scott-Morton (1999). That is, the strategy profiles A_t are ordered by increasing aggregate cost, $C = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it}C_{it}$ and the first A_t that satisfies the equilibrium condition (10) is accepted as the solution. Note that our distributional assumptions on s_t guarantee that no two C can be equal so that this ordering of the A_t is unique. Moreover, none of the C_{it} can equal one another; and when that is true we have never failed to be able to compute a pure strategy equilibrium for each parameter value as soon as we compute a sufficient number of value function iterations.

In general, because we use importance sampling and Bayesian MCMC methods, as long

¹⁷An alternative is to apply a modified Howard acceleration strategy as described in Kuhn (2006); see also Rust (1996) and Howard (1960). The idea is simple: The solution $\{A_t^E\}$ of the game with payoffs (9) will not change much, if at all, for small changes in the value function $V(s)$. Therefore, rather than recompute the solution at every step of the (b_K, B_k) iterations, one can reuse a solution for a few steps.

as one is willing to assume that the data is generated from a pure strategy equilibrium at the true parameter value, a parameter and state trajectory pair that has no equilibrium can be regarded as an irrelevant portion of the parameter space and rejected at the MCMC likelihood comparison step. That is, given parameters, only particles that produce equilibria are retained. A state trajectory that does not produce an equilibrium could not have occurred.

6 Likelihood Computation

Denote the part of the state vector that is unobservable to us by

$$X_t = (C_{u,1,t}, \dots, C_{u,I,t}). \quad (16)$$

Denote the variables that we can observe by

$$Y_t = (A_{1t}^o, \dots, A_{It}^o, C_{k,1,t}, \dots, C_{k,I,t}, R_t). \quad (17)$$

As previously, a lower case variable denotes the logarithm of an upper case variable with the exception that $a_t = A_t$. With these conventions, $x_t = (c_{u,1,t}, \dots, c_{u,I,t})$, and $y_t = (a_{1t}, \dots, a_{It}, c_{k,1,t}, \dots, c_{k,I,t}, r_t)$. Recall that cost evolves as

$$c_{i,t} = c_{u,i,t} + c_{k,i,t} \quad (18)$$

$$c_{u,i,t} = \mu_c + \rho_c (c_{u,i,t-1} - \mu_c) + \sigma_c e_{it} \quad (19)$$

$$c_{k,i,t} = \rho_c c_{k,i,t-1} - \kappa_c A_{i,t-1}^o \quad (20)$$

and revenue evolves as

$$r_t = \mu_r + \sigma_r e_{I+1,t}. \quad (21)$$

We have data for both the pre- and post-scandal periods. The pre-scandal period is indexed by $t = -n_0, \dots, 0$ and the values of Y_t over the pre-scandal period are denoted by Y_{pre} . The post-scandal period is indexed by $t = 1, \dots, n$ with values over it denoted by Y_{post} .

While the scandal changed the market structure thus rendering the pre-scandal data unsuitable for general estimation, it can still be used for two purposes: The pre-scandal entries $\{A_{it}^o\}_{t=-n_0}^0$ can be used to compute the last two pre-scandal values $c_{k,i,-1}$ and $c_{k,i,0}$ of the observable part of log cost for each firm; The scandal log revenues $\{r_t\}_{t=-n_0}^0$ can be used to help identify the parameters μ_r and σ_r .

We compute the last two pre-scandal values $c_{k,i,-1}$ and $c_{k,i,0}$ for each firm by running the recursion (20) started at $-n_0$ over the observed choices $\{A_{it}^o\}_{t=-n_0}^0$. This gives us the vectors y_{-1} and y_0 because (R_{-1}, A_{-1}^o) and (R_0, A_0^o) are also in Y_{pre} .

How to use the pre-scandal log revenue to help identify the parameters μ_r and σ_r is discussed in Subsection 6.3.

6.1 Boundedly Rational Likelihood

Because we are estimating a game of pure strategy, a density for the strategy profile A_t that depends only on (x_t, r_t, y_{t-1}) and the model parameters introduced thus far¹⁸ would put mass one on a single value of A_t . The implication is that a likelihood that depends only on these parameters and $\{(x_t, r_t, y_{t-1})\}_{t=1}^n$ would be one if we predict every entry decision perfectly and zero otherwise. Estimation with such a likelihood would not be practicable.

We resolve this problem by defining a misclassification probability $q_a = 1 - p_a$, $0 < p_a < 1$, and adopting¹⁹ the following likelihood for an observed (ex post) action profile A_t^o

$$p(A_t^o | r_t, x_t, y_{t-1}, \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^I (p_a)^{I(A_{it}^o = A_{it})} (1 - p_a)^{I(A_{it}^o \neq A_{it})} \quad (22)$$

where A_{it} is the predicted entry decision computed from the model given (x_t, r_t, y_{t-1}) and

$$\theta = (\mu_c, \rho_c, \sigma_c, \kappa_c, \mu_r, \sigma_r, \gamma, \beta, p_a) \quad (23)$$

using the methods described in Section 5. The full likelihood for the data is, of course, the product $\prod_{t=1}^n p(A_t^o | r_t, x_t, y_{t-1}, \theta)$.

There are several ways that one can justify this likelihood of which the most appealing is that there is a small probability q_a that planned entry decisions are not realized. This could come about, e.g., because a decision to enter is thwarted by disapproval of an ANDA application or because a decision not to enter is effectively reversed by an acquisition. Less appealing interpretations are that (22) represents measurement error either on the part of the econometrician or the firm due to, e.g., clerical error or firms not being able to observe competitors' entry decisions before a decision must be made on the next drug coming off

¹⁸ $\mu_c, \rho_c, \sigma_c, \kappa_c, \mu_r, \sigma_r, \gamma, \beta$

¹⁹Our approach is similar to that frequently adopted in likelihood based inference when estimating reservation wages in labor search models, and in estimating models of option pricing and yield curves.

patent. The various interpretations have different likelihood implications. We shall adopt the first interpretation that there is a small probability that plans are not realized.

A firm can either take the probability q_a that plans will not be realized into account or not in making its entry decision. Because ignoring q_a dramatically reduces the cost of computing a decision and because, as seen later, ignoring q_a for small p_a has little effect on decisions, solving the game with q_a ignored can be viewed as a boundedly rational solution strategy. Conversely, taking q_a into account can be viewed as a fully rational strategy.

The boundedly rational likelihood is easy to describe: It is (22) with A_t computed as described in Section 5. When it is necessary to distinguish a boundedly rational equilibrium, we use the notation A_t^{BR} .

6.2 Fully Rational Likelihood

In a fully rational solution, firms account for the potential discrepancy between future equilibrium and ex post action profiles in forming continuation values. This requires redefinition of the choice specific value function (9) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & V_i^f(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \\ &= \sum_{l_1=0}^1 p_a^{l_1=A_{1t}} q_a^{l_1 \neq A_{1t}} \dots \sum_{l_I=0}^1 p_a^{l_I=A_{It}} q_a^{l_I \neq A_{It}} \left\{ l_i \left(\frac{R_t^\gamma}{\sum_{j=1}^I l_j} - C_{it} \right) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i^f(A_{i,t+1}^E, A_{-i,t+1}^E, C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) \mid L_{i,t}, L_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right] \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (9')$$

where $L_{i,t} = l_i$ and $L_{-i,t}$ is (l_1, \dots, l_I) with l_i deleted. Note that $L_{i,t}$ and $L_{-i,t}$ affect the conditioning information via equations (18) through (20). Specifically,

$$\begin{aligned} c_{j,t+1} &= c_{u,j,t+1} + c_{k,j,t+1} \\ c_{u,j,t+1} &= \mu_c + \rho_c (c_{u,j,t} - \mu_c) + \sigma_c e_{j,t+1} \\ c_{k,j,t+1} &= \rho_c c_{k,j,t} - \kappa_c l_j \end{aligned}$$

both for $j \in L_{i,t}$ and $j \in L_{-i,t}$; l_j , like A_j , is one for entry and zero otherwise.

A fully rational stationary pure strategy equilibrium is defined by a best response strategy profile $(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E)$ that satisfies (10) with V^f replacing V . When it is necessary to distinguish a fully rational equilibrium, we use the notation A_t^{FR} .

The ex ante value function is related to the choice specific value function by (11) with V^f replacing V and A_t^{FR} replacing A^E . The expression that replaces (12) is more complicated and cannot be described by simple plug-in rules as with the replacements for (10) and (11). However, we have no need for an explicit expression because the ex ante Bellman equation is defined operationally by the algorithm described in Section 5. That algorithm makes no explicit use of (12). It only uses the choice specific value function defined by (9) and the fact that the left hand sides of (9) and (12) are the same at an equilibrium due to (11). All that is required to compute the fully rational equilibrium is to modify Step 5 of that algorithm by replacing (9) by (9'), $A_{i,t}$ by $L_{i,t}$, and $A_{-i,t}$ by $L_{-i,t}$.

The fully rational likelihood is (22) with $A_t = A_t^{FR}$.

The algorithm for parameter estimation described Section 7 applies to both the boundedly rational likelihood and the fully rational likelihood. The results from implementing both for the data displayed in Table 1 are discussed in Section 8.

6.3 Pre-Scandal Information

While the scandal may have affected which firms participated in the market post-scandal, there is no reason to believe that market opportunities were different pre- and post-scandal. Therefore the pre-scandal data can be used to help identify the revenue distribution. From Y_{pre} we can compute a normal likelihood for log revenue over the period $-n_0, \dots, 0$. Although this likelihood actually only depends on two elements (μ_r, σ_r) of θ , we denote it as $p(Y_{pre} | \theta)$ for convenience.

7 Parameter Estimation

Douced, de Freitas, and Gordon (2001) present a concise description of the sequential importance sampler that we follow in describing our analysis. The densities relevant to a sequential importance sampler are the transition density of the hidden state vector

$$p(x_t | x_{t-1}, \theta), \tag{24}$$

which is defined by recursion equation (19), the initial density

$$p(x_0 | \theta), \tag{25}$$

which, from equation (19), is normal with mean μ_c and standard deviation $\sigma_c/\sqrt{1-\rho_c^2}$, and the observation density

$$p(y_t | y_{t-1}, x_t, \theta) = p(A_t^o | r_t, y_{t-1}, x_t, \theta) p(r_t | y_{t-1}, x_t, \theta), \quad (26)$$

where, from equation (21), $p(r_t | y_{t-1}, x_t, \theta)$ is normal with mean μ_r and standard deviation σ_r .

The sequential importance sampler is as follows:

1. For $t = 0$

(a) Start N particles by drawing $x_0^{(j)}$ for $j = 1, \dots, N$ from the initial density equation (25).

(b) Compute

$$\begin{aligned} p(y_0 | \theta) &= \int p(y_0 | y_{-1}, x_0, \theta) p(y_{-1}, x_0 | \theta) dx_0 \\ &\doteq \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N p(y_0 | y_{-1}, x_0^{(j)}, \theta). \end{aligned}$$

2. For $t = 1, \dots, n$

(a) For each particle, draw $\tilde{x}_t^{(j)}$ from the transition density equation (24) and set

$$\tilde{x}_{0:t}^{(j)} = (x_{0:t-1}^{(j)}, \tilde{x}_t^{(j)}).$$

(b) For each particle compute the particle weights $\hat{w}_t^{(j)}$ using the observation density equation (26); i.e.

$$\tilde{w}_t^{(j)} = p(y_t | y_{t-1}, \tilde{x}_t^{(j)}, \theta).$$

The parametrization in equation (22) eliminates the problem that the weights could all be zero.

(c) Normalize the weights so that they sum to one

$$\hat{w}_t^{(j)} = \frac{\tilde{w}_t^{(j)}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \tilde{w}_t^{(j)}}.$$

(d) For $j = 1, \dots, N$ sample with replacement the particles $x_{0:t}^{(j)}$ from the set $\{\tilde{x}_{0:t}^{(j)}\}$ according to the weights $\{\hat{w}_t^{(j)}\}$. (Note the convention: Particles with unequal weights are denoted by $\{\tilde{x}_{0:t}^{(j)}\}$. After resampling the particles are denoted by $\{x_{0:t}^{(j)}\}$.)

(e) Compute

$$\begin{aligned} p(y_t | y_{1:t-1}, \theta, p_a) &= \int p(y_t | y_{t-1}, x_t, \theta) p(y_{t-1}, x_t | y_{1:t-1}, \theta) dx_t \\ &\doteq \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N p(y_t | y_{t-1}, x_t^{(j)}, \theta). \end{aligned}$$

Note that $p(y_t | y_{t-1}, x_t^{(j)}, \theta)$ does not have to be recomputed here if the weights $\tilde{w}_t^{(j)}$ are associated to $x_t^{(j)}$ in the resampling step and saved. If each firm's entry decisions are similarly associated, then classification error rates can be computed at this step.

3. The likelihood is

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = p(y_{0:t} | \theta) = p(Y_{pre} | \theta, p_a) p(y_0 | \theta) \prod_{t=1}^n p(y_t | y_{0:t-1}, \theta).$$

Figure 1 about here

Figure 2 about here

Figure 3 about here

Figure 4 about here

The log likelihood surface is plotted on a fine grid in Figure 1 and on a coarse grid in Figure 2 for the three firm model. Figures 3 and 4 are for the four firm model. The endpoints of the horizontal axes are tenth of a standard deviation to the left and right of the maximum in Figure 1 and 24 standard deviations to the right and left in Figure 2. For Figures 3

and 4 they are a tenth and 48. These are profile likelihoods; i.e., in each panel the indicated parameter is moved and all others are fixed at the values that maximize the likelihood.

As seen from Figures 1 and 3, the surface is, basically, a step function so that curvature at the maximum will not provide a reliable basis for inference. The reason, of course, is that small changes in the parameters do not cause the decisions of the firms to change. In this situation, accurate frequentist inference would be difficult and would be prohibitively computationally intensive if bootstrapping were involved. On the other hand, Bayesian inference in this situation is conceptually straightforward and computationally feasible.

However, Figures 2 and 4 do suggest that implementing a Bayesian strategy that explores the surface well will be a challenge. They also suggest that the standard deviations of the posterior will be extremely tight. The horizontal line is at three orders of magnitude below the maximum. If an MCMC chain is near the maximum, the chance that it will move to a point below the horizontal line is less than 0.001.

An MCMC chain that uses a move-one-at-a-time random walk proposal density will usually do a good job of exploring surfaces such as seen in Figures 2 and 4; see Gamerman and Lopes (2006). However this comes at a cost because an MCMC chain that uses a move-one-at-a-time random walk proposal strategy is usually inefficient relative to those that use other proposal strategies. Briefly, the method is as follows: The proposal density $q(\theta^o, \theta^*)$ defines a distribution of potential new values θ^* given an old value θ^o . Denote the likelihood by $\mathcal{L}(\theta)$ and the prior by $\pi(\theta)$. Given the value θ^o at the end of the MCMC chain, one moves the chain forward one step to θ' as follows:

1. Draw θ^* according to $q(\theta^o, \theta^*)$.
2. Let $\alpha = \min\left(1, \frac{\mathcal{L}(\theta^*)\pi(\theta^*)q(\theta^o, \theta^*)}{\mathcal{L}(\theta^o)\pi(\theta^o)q(\theta^*, \theta^o)}\right)$.
3. With probability α , set $\theta' = \theta^*$, otherwise set $\theta' = \theta^o$.

For our particular q , one randomly chooses an element j of θ^o to move and then proposes a new value by replacing θ_j^o with a draw from the normal distribution with mean θ_j^o and scale σ_j , where σ_j is chosen such that acceptance at Step (3) occurs with a frequency of about 30% (see e.g., Gelman, Roberts, and Gilks (1996), Roberts and Rosenthal (2001)).

The vertical lines in Figures 2 and 4 indicate the range of the MCMC chain's excursions after the transient elements of the chain have died out.

The likelihood is hierarchical in that given model parameters and conditional upon the latent cost variables, it can be evaluated by solving the game. Given this structure, estimation can be viewed as a double-layer nesting of the conditional likelihood within an outer MCMC loop and an inner importance sampling loop. The MCMC proposal density fixes θ in the outer loop. The sequential importance sampler generates a cost trajectory within the inner loop. Solving the game both evaluates the conditional likelihood along this trajectory and provides the importance sampler with the information needed to adjust costs sequentially along the trajectory to take into account the effect of entry decisions on the trajectory. When one falls through the inner loop, the likelihood has been averaged over costs thereby averaging out the latent cost distribution. At this point the MCMC accept/reject decision is made and the MCMC chain is moved forward. One iterates through the outer loop to obtain the complete MCMC chain.

We implement our computational algorithm using code that is in the public domain and available at <http://econ.duke.edu/webfiles/arg/emm>. This code is based on Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). Full details regarding the proposal density and other conventions are in the User's Guide distributed with the code. One needs enough draws to accurately compute averages such as standard deviations, histograms, and other characteristics of the posterior distribution. Our chains are highly correlated so that very long chains with a stride (sampling rate) of 375 are required to break the dependence. As explained in the User's Guide, computations can be accelerated if the values of θ visited by the chain are restricted to (fractional) powers of two. We impose this restriction on the chain.

The parameter p_a can either be estimated or be fixed at various values. We tried values from 0.75 to 0.95. We find that estimates of the other elements of θ are hardly affected. What we do find is that varying p_a affects the rate at which particles die out at Step (2d) in the sequential importance sampler. Since we are not using the sequential importance sampler as a smoother, the rate at which particles die out is of no concern. We always have a large number of points available at Step (2e) of the sequential importance sampler; we experimented with different number of particles till the results were not sensitive to

the choice of number of particles. When p_a is treated as a parameter to be estimated, the performance of the MCMC algorithm is degraded somewhat. We think that fixing p_a is preferred because doing so improves performance and permits a cleaner comparison of results across the cases $I = 3, 4$ that we consider in Section 8.

The firm’s discount rate β is extremely difficult to estimate in studies of this sort (see e.g., Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Rust (1994)) and we find this to be the case here.²⁰ A common rule of thumb in business is not to undertake a project whose internal rate of return is less than 20%. Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi (2002) state that estimates of internal rates specific to the drug industry range “from 13.5% to over 20%.” Theoretically, a firm should not undertake a project whose rate of return is less than its cost of capital. The historical risk premium in the drug industry is 12.55%, (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)). Adding to this a nominal borrowing rate of 5% one arrives at the value 17.55%. Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi (2002) arrive at a nominal cost of capital of 14% using a CAPM method that they regard as biased downward. On the basis of these considerations we set the firm’s discount rate at 20%. There are 40 market entry opportunities in our five years of data. That implies an expected time increment of 0.125 years between prospective projects for the firms in our data. Therefore, using an annual internal rate of 20%, allowing for compounding, and rounding to a nearby fractional power of two, we set $\beta = 0.96875$.

Examination of equation (9) indicates that were γ to enter as a linear factor then γ would not be identified. That in fact it enters to the first order as $(1 + \gamma \log R)$ does not help matters much. Attempts to estimate γ anyway yield estimates that meander about 0.93. Therefore, based on the plausible lower bound of 0.908 derived in Section 4 and our experience from trying to estimate γ , we take 0.93 to be a reasonable value. Rounding to a nearby fractional power of two, we set $\gamma = 0.9375$.

For the remaining parameters we use flat, noninformative priors that impose these support conditions: $-1 \leq \rho_c \leq 1$, $0 \leq \kappa_c$, $0 < \sigma_c$, and $0 < \sigma_r$.²¹

²⁰See Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and Hu and Shum (2008) for more results on nonparameteric identification of single agent dynamic discrete choice models.

²¹Open ended ranges actually should have large upper and lower bounds to assure stationarity of the MCMC chain. As seen from our histograms, Figures 5 and 6, bounds do not interfere with the chain.

8 Results

We estimate both the boundedly rational and fully rational models for two cases: (1) the top three dominant firms are the only potential entrants that are strategic competitors (the actions of the remaining 48 firms are accounted for by the parameter γ), and (2) the top four dominant firms are only potential entrants (the actions of the other 47 entrants are accounted for by γ). The mode and standard deviations of the posterior distribution are reported in Table 2 for the boundedly rational model and in Table 3 for the fully rational model. We focus on the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution because it actually corresponds to a value at which the model has been evaluated. Other measures of central tendency of the posterior distribution can be misleading when studying the behavior of a structural model because they may have never appeared in the MCMC chain and could give a distorted view of the model were it to be evaluated at such a point.

Table 2 about here

Table 3 about here

As evident from these two tables, the parameter estimates are very similar across the boundedly rational and the fully rational models. Therefore in the rest of paper we will discuss the results using the boundedly rational model. The parameters are tightly estimated²² and, as seen from the extremely low classification error rates, model predictions are quite accurate. The large value of ρ_c implies costs are persistent. A value of κ_c of 0.07 implies that an immediate cost reduction of 7% going into the next market opening, and the average annual cumulative reduction computed using the AR(1) cost process (equation (2)) is 51%. However, σ_c is large, so that this reduction can easily be eliminated by a cost shock.²³

Histograms of the marginal posterior distributions are displayed in Figures 5 and 6 for the three and four firm cases, respectively.

²²Despite the small standard deviations shown in Table 2, the profile likelihoods in Figures 2 and 4 suggest that the MCMC chain adequately explored the posterior density. The likelihood is proportional to the posterior because priors are flat.

²³One source of this large standard deviation may be organizational forgetting (see e.g., Benkard (2000), Besanko, Kryukov, Doraszelski, and Satterthwaite (2007)). However, since we do not explicitly model forgetting in the AR(1) cost process we are cautious in making this interpretation.

Figure 5 about here

Figure 6 about here

Figure 7 about here

Figure 8 about here

Figure 9 about here

Figure 7 plots the log cost of the three dominant firms in the three firm model in the upper three panels. The circles indicate that the firm entered that market. The logarithm of cost is computed by averaging at Step (2e) of the importance sampler. The bottom panel shows log total revenue; the numbers at the bottom of this panel are the number of dominant firms who entered the market at that time point. The top firm, Mylan, has a clear cost advantage over its competitors. Broad trends in cost are about the same for all firms.

Figure 8 plots together the log cost of the three dominant firms from both the 3 and 4 firm models. The circles at the bottom of the upper panel indicate which markets Mylan entered, the crosses in the middle panel are the same for Novopharm, and the asterisks in the lower panel are the same for Lemmon. The construction of the plots is the same as for Figure 7. The salient feature of this plot is that costs for the three dominant firms are estimated as being about the same in the three and four firm models.

Figure 9 displays the entry decisions of the dominant firms, period by period, as circles and the model's average prediction of their entry, period by period, as crosses. The average prediction is computed by averaging game solutions at Step (2e) of the importance sampler at the mode of the posterior density. The classification error rates shown in Table 2 can be viewed as the errors that would obtain if decisions were predicted by using a threshold of 0.5 to predict entry (i.e., entry if predicted probability ≥ 0.5 ; no entry otherwise) for the average predictions shown in Figure 9.

Another way to assess results is to directly explore the possibility that the firms play a different game than the game we propose rather than inferring the importance of the

dynamics from the estimate of κ_c . Consider two other games analogous to the previous partial solution model that might be played instead of the game with payoffs (9). They could play a game with payoffs

$$V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) = A_{it} (R_t^\gamma / N_t - C_{u,i,t}), \quad (27)$$

where no attention at all is paid to the cost reductions arising from past market entries ($\kappa_c = 0$) or to dynamic spillovers of entry ($\beta = 0$). We call this the *myopic* game ($\beta = 0, \kappa_c = 0$). Or they could play a game with payoffs

$$V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) = A_{it} (R_t^\gamma / N_t - C_{it}) \quad (28)$$

where they take cognizance of the effect of entry on costs but ignore the continuation value of the game, i.e., $\beta = 0$. We call this the *static* game ($\beta = 0, \kappa_c > 0$).

For the three firm game the myopic game ($\beta = 0, \kappa_c = 0$) has an equilibrium that agrees with the solution of the game we propose (i.e., the game with payoffs (9)) in 49% of the cases. The game that ignores the continuation value ($\beta = 0, \kappa_c > 0$) has an equilibrium that agrees in 81% of the cases. For the four firm game, these values are 31% and 68%, respectively.

These values were computed by using the posterior modes shown for the game in Table 2 and finding all equilibria for the three games for all costs that obtained at Step (2b) of the sequential importance sampler. Incidentally, we can also compute the incidence of multiple equilibria for these three games. For the three firm game they are 5% ($\beta = 0, \kappa_c = 0$), 5% ($\beta = 0, \kappa_c > 0$), and 4% ($\beta > 0, \kappa_c > 0$), respectively. For the four firm game they are 5%, 7%, and 4%, respectively. As discussed earlier, we adopt an explicit equilibrium selection rule, i.e., we pick the equilibrium with the lowest total cost.

These computations suggest that the myopic and static games would do a poor job of rationalizing the data. To check, we use our parameter estimates, impose $\beta = \kappa_c = 0$, and find that the overall classification error rate for the myopic game exceeds the overall value in Table 2 by a factor of 3.8 for the three player game and 3.6 for the four player game. Similarly, imposing $\beta = 0$, we find that the classification error rate for the static game exceeds the values in Table 2 by a factor of 2.0 for both the three and four player games.

It is worth asking the question whether what is recovered is the dynamic spillover effect of entry, i.e., entry reduces costs or whether the causality is reversed and it is low cost

firms that enter. In the latter case one could think of a situation where there is persistent heterogeneity in costs across firms and the low cost firms always enter and the high cost firms stay out. Recall that in our model all firms are the same ex ante. Heterogeneity in costs arises endogenously based in part on past actions. Therefore Figures 7, 8, and 9 are to be viewed as ex-post reconstructions of the history of the game. However, one might surmise from the volatility of the plots that too much emphasis is being placed on the trajectory of equation (4) (i.e., the “unknown” component of costs) and not enough on (5) (i.e., “known” component of costs). Stated differently, one might surmise that the effect of the random shocks (operating through σ_c) is too large and of the dynamic spillovers (through κ_c) is too small or that more generally σ_c and κ_c are correlated. One way to check this is to set σ_c to smaller values and re-run the MCMC chain. Setting σ_c to 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625 has very little effect on κ_c although it does dramatically reduce the likelihood evaluated at the mode. Thus we conclude that we are estimating the effect of entry on costs and not vice versa.

9 Conclusions

In this paper we provide evidence on the dynamic spillover effects of past industry experience in one product market on performance in other product markets for the generic pharmaceutical industry. Our stylized model fits the data well, i.e., the classification error rates are small. Our results also enhance understanding of entry decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. We find evidence that past entry affects current costs and that the dynamic evolution of the production cost plays an important role in the equilibrium path of the generic pharmaceutical industry structure. In order to do estimate our model we develop a procedure based on sequential importance sampling to estimate a dynamic discrete game that includes serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables. Our method is more generally applicable to estimating dynamic games in which heterogeneity between agents arises from serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables. Our method is feasible whenever there is available an algorithm for solving the game and a Markovian representation of the latent dynamics.

The spillover effect estimated in this paper is related to experience gained in producing drugs in the form of oral solids. It may be worthwhile in future work to quantify other sources

of spillovers. This beyond the scope of this paper due to the prohibitive computational burden it would impose by expanding the state space. Another important extension would be to allow for estimation of dynamic games where the strategy set is mixed discrete-continuous, e.g., introduction of a new brand and the associated decision about advertising expenditure.

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Table 1. Data

Drug / Active Ingredient	ANDA Date	Dominant Firms (enter = 1, not enter = 0)				Total Entrants	Revenue (\$'000s)
		Mylan	Novopharm	Lemmon	Geneva		
Sulindac	03 Apr. 90	1	0	1	1	7	189010
Erythromycin Stearate	15 May 90	0	0	0	0	1	13997
Atenolol	31 May 90	1	0	0	0	4	69802
Nifedipine	04 Jul. 90	0	1	0	0	5	302983
Minocycline Hydrochloride	14 Aug. 90	0	0	0	0	3	55491
Methotrexate Sodium	15 Oct. 90	1	0	0	0	3	24848
Pyridostigmine Bromide	27 Nov. 90	0	0	0	0	1	2113
Estropipate	27 Feb. 91	0	0	0	0	2	6820
Loperamide Hydrochloride	30 Aug. 91	1	1	1	1	5	31713
Phendimetrazine	30 Oct. 91	0	0	0	0	1	1269
Tolmetin Sodium	27 Nov. 91	1	1	1	1	7	59108
Clemastine Fumarate	31 Jan. 92	0	0	1	0	1	9077
Cinoxacin	28 Feb. 92	0	0	0	0	1	6281
Diltiazem Hydrochloride	30 Mar. 92	1	1	0	0	5	439125
Nortriptyline Hydrochloride	30 Mar. 92	1	0	0	1	3	187683
Triamterene	30 Apr. 92	0	0	0	1	2	22092
Piroxicam	29 May 92	1	1	1	0	9	309756
Griseofulvin Ultramicrocrystalline	30 Jun. 92	0	0	0	0	1	11727
Pyrazinamide	30 Jun. 92	0	0	0	0	1	306
Diflunisal	31 Jul. 92	0	0	1	0	2	96488
Carbidopa	28 Aug. 92	0	0	1	0	4	117233
Pindolol	03 Sep. 92	1	1	0	1	7	37648
Ketoprofen	22 Dec. 92	0	0	0	0	2	107047
Gemfibrozil	25 Jan. 93	1	0	1	0	5	330539
Benzonatate	29 Jan. 93	0	0	0	0	1	2597
Methadone Hydrochloride	15 Apr. 93	0	0	0	0	1	1858
Methazolamide	30 Jun. 93	0	0	0	1	3	4792
Alprazolam	19 Oct. 93	1	1	0	0	7	614593
Nadolol	31 Oct. 93	1	0	0	0	2	125379
Levonorgestrel	13 Dec. 93	0	0	0	0	1	47836
Metoprolol Tartrate	21 Dec. 93	1	1	0	1	9	235625
Naproxen	21 Dec. 93	1	1	1	1	8	456191
Naproxen Sodium	21 Dec. 93	1	1	1	1	7	164771
Guanabenz Acetate	28 Feb. 94	0	0	0	0	2	18120
Triazolam	25 Mar. 94	0	0	0	0	2	71282
Glipizide	10 May 94	1	0	0	0	1	189717
Cimetidine	17 May 94	1	1	0	0	3	547218
Flurbiprofen	20 Jun. 94	1	0	0	0	1	155329
Sulfadiazine	29 Jul. 94	0	0	0	0	1	72
Hydroxychloroquine Sulfate	30 Sep. 94	0	0	0	0	1	8492
Mean		0.45	0.28	0.25	0.25	3.3	126901

Shown is the post-scandal data used in the study. The entry decisions of the four dominant firms are indicated by 1 for entry and 0 for no entry. Total Entrants are how many of the fifty-one potential entrants entered, including the dominant firms. Revenue is in thousands of dollars, and is the revenue of the branded product in the year before patent expiration.

Table 2. Posterior Distribution: Partial Solution Model

Parameter	Number of Potential Entrants (excluding “other” firms)	
	3 firms	4 firms
μ_c	10.05 (0.017)	10.07 (0.0014)
ρ_c	0.9866 (0.00086)	0.9873 (5.6e-05)
σ_c	0.3721 (0.026)	0.3675 (3.0e-04)
κ_c	0.06655 (0.0015)	0.07067 (1.1e-04)
μ_r	9.906 (0.083)	10.008 (0.0037)
σ_r	1.591 (0.060)	1.682 (0.0023)
γ	0.9375	0.9375
β	0.9688	0.9688
p_a	0.9375	0.9375
CER firm 1	0.0857	0.1208
CER firm 2	0.0788	0.0876
CER firm 3	0.1038	0.1061
CER firm 4		0.1374
CER all firms	0.0894	0.1130
MCMC Reps	3000000	3000000
stride	375	375

Shown is the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution not the modes of the marginal posterior distributions. The multivariate posterior mode does correspond to a set of parameter settings that actually occur in the MCMC chain whereas other measures of central tendency such as the mean or marginal medians might not. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. CER is the classification error rate when the parameters are set to the posterior mode. They are computed at Step 2e of the importance sampler. At that point in the algorithm the predicted actions $A_{i,t,j}$ are known for each firm i at each time t for each particle j and can be compared to the observed actions A_{it}^o . The CER is the the proportion of the cases where $A_{it}^o \neq A_{i,t,j}$ computed both by firm and overall.

Table 3. Posterior Distribution: Full Solution Model

Parameter	Number of Potential Entrants (excluding “other” firms)	
	3 firms	4 firms
μ_c	10.06 (0.016)	10.07 (0.00015)
ρ_c	0.9877 (0.00095)	0.9873 (5.4e-05)
σ_c	0.3714 (0.037)	0.3676 (0.00046)
κ_c	0.06634 (0.0012)	0.0704 (0.00013)
μ_r	9.941 (0.064)	10.009 (0.00037)
σ_r	1.531 (0.059)	1.682 (0.00017)
γ	0.9375	0.9375
β	0.9688	0.9688
p_a	0.9375	0.9375
CER firm 1	0.0861	0.1045
CER firm 2	0.0786	0.0837
CER firm 3	0.0971	0.0860
CER firm 4		0.1351
CER all firms	0.0873	0.1023
MCMC Reps	3000000	2000000
stride	375	25

Shown is the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution not the modes of the marginal posterior distributions. The multivariate posterior mode does correspond to a set of parameter settings that actually occur in the MCMC chain whereas other measures of central tendency such as the mean or marginal medians might not. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. CER is the classification error rate when the parameters are set to the posterior mode. They are computed at Step 2e of the importance sampler. At that point in the algorithm the predicted actions $A_{i,t,j}$ are known for each firm i at each time t for each particle j and can be compared to the observed actions A_{it}^o . The CER is the the proportion of the cases where $A_{it}^o \neq A_{i,t,j}$ computed both by firm and overall.




Figure 1. Profile Log Likelihood, Three Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of the profile likelihood plotted for a tenth of the posterior standard deviation to the left and right of the maximum of the likelihood.




Figure 2. Profile Log Likelihood, Three Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of the profile likelihood plotted for 24 posterior standard deviations to the left and right of the maximum of the likelihood. Points that violate support conditions and points below 10^{-6} of the maximum of the likelihood are not plotted. The horizontal line is at 10^{-3} of the maximum. The vertical lines indicate the range of the MCMC chain's excursions after the transient elements of the chain have died out.




Figure 3. Profile Log Likelihood, Four Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of the profile likelihood plotted for a tenth of a posterior standard deviations to the left and right of the maximum of the likelihood.




Figure 4. Profile Log Likelihood, Four Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of the profile likelihood plotted for 48 posterior standard deviations to the left and right of the maximum of the likelihood. Points that violate support conditions and points below 10^{-6} of the maximum of the likelihood are not plotted. The horizontal line is at 10^{-3} of the maximum. The vertical lines indicate the range of the MCMC chain's excursions after the transient elements of the chain have died out.




Figure 5. Marginal Posterior Distributions, Three Firm Model. Shown are histograms constructed from an MCMC chain for the three firm model with 3,000,000 repetitions at a stride of 375 for 8000 net. The salient feature of this graphic is the contrast of the histogram for the parameter κ_c compared to that shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Marginal Posterior Distributions, Four Firm Model. Shown are histograms constructed from an MCMC chain for the four firm model with 1,400,000 repetitions at a stride of 375 for 3733 net. The salient feature of this graphic is the contrast of the histogram for the parameter κ_c compared to that shown in Figure 5.




Figure 7. Cost, Revenue, and Entry Decisions. Plotted as a solid line in the first three panels is the logarithm of cost for the three dominant firms in the three firm model. The logarithm of cost is computed by averaging at Step 2e of the importance sampler at the maximum likelihood estimate. The circles in these plots indicate that the firm entered the market at that time point. The bottom panel shows the logarithm of total revenue. The numbers at the bottom are the count of the number of dominant firms who entered the market at that time point.




Figure 8. Cost and Entry Decisions of the Dominant Firms. Plotted is the logarithm of cost for the three dominant firms. The dashed line is under the three firm model, and the solid under the four firm model. The circles indicate the markets that Mylan entered, crosses the same for Novopharm, and the asterisks for Lemmon. The logarithm of cost as described in the legend of Figure 7.




Figure 9. Actual and Predicted Entry Decisions. Plotted as circles are the entry decisions of the three dominant firms in the three firm model. The crosses are the average predictions of the three firm model computed by averaging game solutions at Step 2e of the importance sampler at the maximum likelihood estimate.