CFDP 2075R

Author(s): 
CFDP Title: 

Information Design: A Unified Perspective


Publication Date: February, 2017
Revised
March, 2017
Pages: 58 pp

Abstract: 

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identi.es the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

Keywords:

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure


JEL Classifications:

C72, D82, D83

JEL Classifications: C72D82D83