

Can Evidence-Based Information Shift Preferences Towards Trade Policy? *

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Abstract

We investigate the role of *evidence-based* information in shaping individuals' preferences for trade policies through a series of survey experiments that contain randomized information treatments. Each information treatment provides a concise statement of economics research findings on how openness to trade has affected labor market outcomes and goods prices. Across annual surveys from 2018-2021, each administered on a representative sample of the US general population, we find that information highlighting the link between trade and manufacturing job losses significantly raises respondents' propensity to select limits on imports as a preferred policy; this tendency is only partially offset if respondents receive additional information describing the accompanying expansion in non-manufacturing jobs. Strikingly (and rather paradoxically), information on the benefits of trade for goods prices also induces protectionist policy choices. Our exploration of underlying mechanisms shows that the treatment effects are not driven by the economic self-interest of respondents or a lack of persuasiveness. Instead, the information appears to reinforce respondents' priors stemming from their political identity and concerns regarding China, while also eliciting loss-averse behavior. The findings point to the challenges in using short evidence-based messages to communicate the benefits of trade to the general public.

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1 Introduction

The impact of globalization on labor markets and workers has been a central issue commanding the attention of politicians and policymakers in many developed countries. In the US, for example, concerns over how openness to trade might affect jobs and wages have been aired since the early 1990s, and intensified following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.¹ These concerns have sowed the seeds for a backlash against globalization, amid the continuing decline in manufacturing sector employment. At the same time, many political actors have tapped into these economic grievances in campaigns and crusades; recent examples include the Brexit episode in the UK, the turn towards protectionism by the Trump administration in the US, and the broad calls for export restrictions at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. Often, these campaigns have operated by disseminating political messaging that calls for protectionist measures, rather than communicating evidence-based information on the benefits and costs of openness to trade.

In this paper, we investigate whether and how *evidence-based* information may influence individuals’ preferences towards trade policy. Can information derived from research, communicated in a concise and accessible manner, shift people’s views and preferences for trade protection? If so, what are the underlying mechanisms through which this influence is exerted? Understanding how evidence-based information might shape individuals’ globalization policy choices is critical and urgent, as economic research on trade policy preferences, typically modelled as a function of economic self-interests and, more recently, social and political identity, has tended to assume a full information environment and abstract from possible biases in the information set that individuals are exposed to, in a stark contrast to the selection of information that has been exacerbated by the rise of digital media platforms.² To answer these questions, a central challenge lies in the need to distinguish the effect of information from those of alternative forces, including the possibility that individuals choose their information sources based on their pre-existing beliefs and self-interests.

We address this issue by developing a series of survey experiments, conducted annually from 2018-2021, that contain randomized information treatments providing a concise sum-

1. During the mid-1990s, a debate emerged with some economists arguing that trade with low-income countries was responsible for low unskilled wages and increased inequality in developed countries (see Wood, 1995). Others considered instead the role of within-industry specialization and evidence from the factor content of trade to argue that the effect of trade on wage inequality was quantitatively small relative to other potential forces (see Krugman 1995, 2000, Lawrence 1998). For follow-up on this debate, see Krugman (2005), Lawrence (2007), among others.

2. A key exception is Ponzetto et al. (2020) who explores how information can affect support for protectionism in a model setting in which information acquisition is costly. More broadly, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010, 2011) document how members of the public *de facto* sort themselves to print and internet news outlets according to their right-left political preferences.

mary of evidence established by economic researchers on the gains and losses from trade. By randomizing information treatments across a representative pool of respondents drawn from the general population, the experiment enables us to establish the causal impact of the specific information received on respondents' subsequent preferences over policies. The survey also solicits detailed information on participants' demographic, economic, social, political, and behavioral characteristics to both account for the alternative factors underlying policy preferences and explore potential mechanisms through which information may or may not shape individual views and policy choices. The unique time span of the survey further allows us to examine trade policy preferences among the US public over time, as well as how responses to information may (or may not) have varied during this period of unprecedented disruptions to the global economy and fast-changing political developments.

We administered the survey over four separate runs: July 2018, April 2019, April-June 2020, and April-May 2021. In all, our sample comprises over 12,000 participants from the US general population. The survey consists of four main parts, namely: (i) a background section that solicits respondents' demographic characteristics as well as socioeconomic and political beliefs; (ii) a treatment section that offers evidence-based information on either the gains or the losses (or both) from trade; (iii) a post-treatment section that solicits respondents' preferences over economic policies; and (iv) a final section that validates how well the participants engaged with the survey and solicits explanations to selected policy choices.

The first section of the survey collects the background characteristics of the respondent, including basic biodata (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, residence, level of education, employment status, and household income), political and economic beliefs (e.g., which party's candidate he/she supported in the 2016 presidential election; views on how big a problem inequality is in the US today; degree of trust in government; degree of satisfaction with the health of the job market; impact of NAFTA on the respondent and his/her family; willingness to pay more for a US brand), news consumption patterns (e.g., frequency of following the news; main news sources), and behavioral traits (e.g., tendency toward loss aversion).

The second part of the survey then administers a randomized information treatment. The control group receives a baseline survey that provides no information. Each treatment group in turn receives a concise piece of information stressing a specific employment or price effect of trade that has been found to be quantitatively important in economics research: The "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative provides a statement of the main finding from Autor et al. (2013) that the rise in imports from China hurt the labor market outcomes of manufacturing workers in the US. The "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative offers a description of how the growth in imports from China led the US to specialize more in service sectors, which increased the

total number of jobs in the US economy, as established by Caliendo et al. (2019). The “Trade Helps Prices” narrative highlights how the rise in imports from China led to lower prices, both for durable goods (such as computers, electrical products, and furniture) and non-durable goods (such as apparel). In a converse version, the “Tariff Hurts Prices” narrative describes the findings from Amiti et al. (2019) which show that the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods and lowered US real income by \$1.4 billion per month.

To make the information as accessible as possible to the general public, each of the narratives includes simplified, comparable texts that eliminate technical jargon as well as a figure that visually illustrates the key trends over time with regard to employment or price outcomes.³ It should be stressed that each of the narratives is evidence-based; in particular, we do not deliberately expose participants to misinformation, falsified accounts, or hypothetical scenarios.

After the information treatment, the next section then solicits respondents’ preferences over policy instruments. We include here a series of questions that directly ask about preferences over such policies as import tariffs, free trade agreements, and the minimum wage. This section also contains a final pair of questions in which respondents are presented with a menu of eight policy options (including “More Limits on Imports”), and are then asked to identify (respectively) their three “Most Preferred” and three “Least Preferred” policies.⁴

In the final part of the survey, we ask participants to validate the type of information treatment they received (specifically, to recall whether the information was on the effect of trade on jobs or prices), as well as to assess whether the conveyed research findings affected their views on trade policy. To obtain direct insights into participants’ choices, we further ask them to explain their expressed preferences for limiting imports if they selected that as one of their three “Most Preferred” policy options.

A number of broad findings emerge. First, pooling across all respondents (i.e., examining unconditional means across all control and treatment groups), when asked direct standalone questions about their preferences for trade restrictions, just over half the respondents agreed with placing more limits on imports (57-62% over the survey runs). Notably though, this support for import limits is considerably lower when respondents were asked to select their three “Most Preferred” policies out of the menu of 8 policy options: The share of respondents who picked “More limits on imports” was 20-30%. By contrast, “Improving education and

3. While an academic citation is provided on the information screen, the identities of the institutions at which the researchers work was not included to avoid possible reputation effects that could potentially bias how much weight the respondents attached to the narratives.

4. The different policy options were presented in a random order to each respondent, to avoid biases that might arise if there is a tendency to pick response options that appear earlier in a list.

worker training”, “Higher taxes on top income earners”, and “Higher minimum wage” were each selected by 50-70% of respondents, suggesting that the preference for protection is not as strong when ranked against alternative policies that can potentially address labor market concerns. Further, there appears to be a slight rise in support for limits on imports over the last two years: 23% of participants selected “More limits on imports as a top-three choice in the pre-pandemic survey runs, but this increased to 27-28% in 2020-2021.

Second, we find that respondents who received the “Trade Hurts Jobs” treatment – focusing on how the surge of imports from China hurt US manufacturing workers – were significantly more likely to express support for more protection, including selecting “More limits on imports” as one of their “Most Preferred” policy measures (relative to the control group that received a null information treatment). This treatment effect is robust across all the rounds of the experiment. The magnitude of the effect is also quantitatively important, around one third of the effect of self-identified political position (as proxied by the party the respondent voted for in the 2016 presidential election).

In contrast to the responses to the job-loss-from-trade information, reactions to the job-gains-from-trade information are, however, highly asymmetric. When presented with a “Trade Helps Jobs” treatment that communicates the job creation effect of trade in non-manufacturing sectors, we see little traction in shifting respondents’ trade policy preferences across all rounds of the survey. More strikingly, exposing participants to the “Trade Helps Prices” information induces protectionist choices: learning that imports from China have contributed to lower prices raises the propensity of respondents to favor more limits on imports and to support higher tariffs, with a magnitude quantitatively comparable to the effect of exposure to the “Trade Hurts Jobs” information. Taken together, our findings on these information treatment effects underscore the challenges of communicating the benefits of trade to the general public through the use of evidence-based information.

To better understand what drives the surprising results throughout the survey period, we explore variants of the baseline treatments. We find that when participants are provided with both the “Trade Hurts Jobs” and “Trade Helps Jobs” treatments, exposure to the “Trade Helps Jobs” information after learning “Trade Hurts Jobs” weakly diminishes respondents’ protectionist responses. This suggests that, while exposure to the job-gains-from-trade information alone is not adequate for shifting trade policy preferences, it can help counteract the effect of the “Trade Hurts Jobs” narrative. Further, we explore another potential explanation that may underlie the unexpected results: a “China” factor. Amid the ongoing trade war and continuing tension between China and the US, it is plausible that the US public could react adversely to any information pertaining to China, even when the information describes the benefits of Chinese imports. To examine this particular channel, we remove

the mention of “China” in an adapted price narrative and find that excluding “China” from the otherwise identical information significantly reduces protectionist responses.

While the treatment narratives in our experiment were designed to be concise, rather than time-intensive, with an average completion time around ten minutes, we demonstrate that the attention of respondents matters. Respondents spending a longer duration on the survey were more likely to correctly recall the nature of the information. Further, respondents who received the “Trade Helps Jobs” narrative appear to have better comprehended the information, and shifted towards being less protectionist, the longer the time spent on the survey. This finding is particularly relevant in an age of fast information consumption whereby individuals are increasingly exposed to condensed information narratives through digital providers. Extended attention may enhance the effectiveness of a narrative, especially when the narrative deviates from the reader’s existing belief.

To shed further light on the mechanisms underlying the documented responses, we explore whether there were differential treatment effects across respondents with different baseline characteristics. The goal here is to assess whether the information received operates by interacting with and reinforcing other factors that themselves influence trade policy preferences. The characteristics considered include proxies for: (a) economic self-interest, such as personal exposure to the labor market effects of trade (via industry of employment, import penetration, or education level); (b) sociotropic concerns, such as concerns over income inequality and trust in government; (c) identity politics such as prior political positions and views; and (d) behavioral factors, in particular, the degree of loss aversion. The evidence highlights the particular importance of non-economic factors, especially that of identity politics and loss aversion. Providing evidence-based information in the context of our experiment triggers differential (i.e., stronger) reactions from those who are more right-leaning and more loss-averse. Economic self-interests and the economic outcomes of trade long stressed in classical trade theories, in contrast, do not appear to directly make individuals more or less elastic to the information. The evidence also underscores the role of concerns over China in determining the policy responses to information, as these featured prominently in the follow-up question among the reasons cited by participants for preferring more limits on imports.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section 3 elaborates on our survey design and its implementation. Section 4 reports broad patterns of policy preferences. Section 5 presents the baseline evidence on the information treatment effects, while Section 6 discusses evidence related to potential explanatory mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our paper builds on an extensive literature on the determinants of trade policy preferences. Baldwin (1989) divides these into two sets of explanations: those that pertain to individuals' economic self-interests and non-economic concerns. The economic self-interest channel generally considers preferences for trade policy as being a function of individuals' endowments or sector-specific skills (Rodrik, 1995; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Blonigen, 2011). If factors are not perfectly mobile, trade will affect income (and hence preferences) based on individuals' factor characteristics (c.f., the specific-factor or Ricardo-Viner model). If factors are mobile, trade will affect income via individuals' factor endowments in relation to their relative abundance in the country (c.f., the Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson effect). More recently, economists have demonstrated empirically that while there are aggregate gains from trade, trade liberalization creates winners and losers. On the one hand, a growing volume of studies led by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013, 2016) and Pierce and Schott (2016) show how import competition, specifically the import surge from China, has reduced manufacturing jobs and low-skill wages in local US labor markets. On the other hand, separate studies argue that cheaper inputs from abroad have made US manufacturing firms more competitive (Amiti et al. 2017) and non-manufacturing employment growth has more than outstripped job losses in the manufacturing sector (Caliendo et al. 2019).⁵ Based on the existing theories and evidence, an individual's preferences for trade policy would be determined by the individual's perceived gains or losses from trade.

A second category of factors that may shape individuals' trade policy preferences relates to non-economic concerns, specifically, social and political identity and behavioral patterns. As Grossman and Helpman (2021) note, preferences over trade policy may reflect not only voter's economic incentives and self-interests but also "concerns for members of those groups in society with whom they identify." Changes in such social identity due to, for example, increased income inequality or societal divisions can lead not only to so-called identity politics but also to changes in trade policy. Similarly, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) argue that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the US economy as a whole is affected by trade. In addition to social and political identity, another non-economic factor is the behavior of loss aversion, that is, the manifestation of an asymmetry in value associated with loss versus gains wherein the disutility of giving up an object is

5. It is worth noting that the debate on whether international trade has been the main reason behind stagnated low-skill wages is far from settled in the academic literature. As documented by Lawrence and Lawrence (2012), manufacturing employment has fallen steadily among most developed nations for decades. A leading alternative hypothesis for the swift decline of manufacturing jobs is technological change whereby the rise of computers, automation and robotics has been the main force displacing low-end manufacturing jobs (see Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).

greater than the utility of acquiring it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984). Freund and Ozcan (2008) and Tovar (2009) show that loss aversion can lead to anti-trade bias in trade policy that favors declining and loss-incurring domestic industries.

The above array of hypotheses have been examined in a body of empirical work assessing the determinants of trade policy preferences based on observational survey data. These studies have found little to mixed support for the role of economic self-interests by examining the effects of human capital endowments and industry characteristics (as a proxy for exposure to trade) on expressed policy preferences. For example, using survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), Blonigen (2011) finds that despite the evidence on the substantial effect of trade policy on worker income, the relationships between labor market attributes and trade policy preferences are not robust in the US, and suggests that either the measures of labor market attributes are poor or the drivers of trade policy preferences go beyond labor market incentives. Blonigen and McGrew (2014), based on similar ANES survey data, explore how task routineness may affect trade policy preferences and find workers performing more routine tasks to be more supportive of import restrictions. The study also shows that education and task routineness are the only two labor market attributes found to be correlated with stated trade policy preferences.⁶

Our paper contributes to the above literature by investigating the role of information pertaining to the gains and losses from trade in shaping individuals' trade policy preferences. Most studies so far have tended to assume individuals are perfectly informed about the positive and negative economic impacts of trade and determine their policy preferences in a full-information environment, while in reality members of the public may be less than fully informed or may even be exposed to a biased set of information. Could access to evidence-based information and becoming better informed on the gains or losses from trade align people's policy choices more closely with their labor market characteristics and economic self-interests? Could learning more about gains from trade mitigate the protectionist desire? To answer these questions, we use an approach of randomized survey experiments that enables us to address the issue of self-selection and unobservables in determining individuals' exposure to information and establish the causal impact of information on expressed policy preferences.

The methodology of randomized information treatments in general-population surveys has been applied in empirical public finance, to understand support for policies related to

6. There is a parallel literature on migration policy preferences that has explored the role of economic circumstances, individual characteristics, and also locational externalities (e.g., fiscal spillovers); see in particular, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Hanson et al. (2017), Mayda (2009), Facchini and Mayda (2009), Card et al. (2012), Mayda et al. (2018), Alesina et al. (2019).

redistribution and taxes (Kuziemko et al. 2015; Fisman et al. 2017; Alesina et al. 2018).⁷ The evidence from this line of work is, however, mixed; for example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) do not find providing information related to inequality to affect expressed preferences towards taxation, a result attributed to the lack of trust in government. More recent applications that explore the degree of support or opposition for economic policy include Alesina et al. (2019), Facchini et al. (2016) and Grigorieff et al. (2017) on immigration, Nguyen (2017), Rho and Tomz (2017), Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) and Rodriguez et al. (2021) on trade, as well as Stancheva (2020) on various economic policies. Specifically on trade-related studies, Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) provide hypothetical information treatments on the underlying causes of job losses in an assumptive manufacturing plant, to understand whether and how the various causes of job losses might affect preferences over remedial policies. Rodriguez et al. (2021) examine the role of question framing in respondents' expressed beliefs on the employment and consumption effects of trade. Stancheva (2020), looking at a broader set of policies, engages participants to provide video instruction treatments on the efficiency, distributional, and fairness effects of taxation, healthcare and trade policies, and finds the instructions can change views about policy mechanisms.

Our work complements the above studies by investigating the role of evidence-based information in shaping people's attitudes and policy preferences. Instead of eliciting responses to hypothetical or framed questions, we convey accessible research findings on the gains and losses from trade, in a format similar to information individuals are exposed to on daily digital platforms, and explore how people might be influenced by the information treatments. We also collect detailed information on participants' demographic, economic, social, political and behavioral characteristics to explore potential mechanisms through which information may or may not shape individuals' views and policy choices. The evidence shows exposure to information on the effects of trade can trigger reactions unsupported by economic self-interests by provoking priors, social identity, and loss aversion. The documented findings are robust throughout the four-year period of the survey despite the unprecedented disruptions and fast-evolving political and economic movements.

3 Survey Design: Methodology and Instrument

To overcome the challenge of establishing the causal effect of information, we developed and conducted a series of surveys that contains randomized information treatments. Randomized provision of information allows the researcher to estimate a causal effect of information

7. This in turn draws on work in the psychology literature on attitudes towards income inequality including, for example, Norton and Ariely (2011), and Chow and Gallak (2012).

exposure on policy preferences, as the information narratives provided constitute an exogenous source of variation across respondents. By analyzing the collected survey data through multivariate regressions, we can then identify the importance of information relative to other respondent characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, political ideology, etc.) in driving individual preferences over economic policies.

Mounted on Qualtrics.com, the survey is designed to be relatively short, taking an average of about ten minutes to complete.⁸ The survey consists of four main parts, including a background section that solicits respondents' demographic and belief information, a treatment section that offers evidence-based information on either the gains and/or the losses from trade, a section that solicits respondents' preferences over economic policies, and a final section that validates how well the participants have engaged with the survey and explores explanations to their choices.

Part 1: Background. The first section of the survey solicits basic background information from the respondent, including:

- (a) Biodata: age; gender; ethnicity; nationality; state of residence; level of education; employment status; household income;
- (b) Background political and economic beliefs: self-placement on liberal vs. conservative policy spectrum; which party's candidate he/she supported in the 2016 presidential election; how big a problem he/she perceives inequality to be in the US today; how much he/she trusts the government; trust in foreigners; his/her degree of satisfaction with the health of the job market; the impact of NAFTA on the respondent's family; view on job as giving a sense of identity; willingness to pay more for a US brand; loss aversion proxies; etc.
- (c) News Sources: frequency he/she follows the news; main news sources (both TV and internet); etc.

Part 2: Information Treatments. The second part of the survey administers the information treatment. Respondents are randomly allocated to the control group or one of the information treatment groups, each with equal probability. Each of the narratives stresses a particular employment or price effect of being open to trade that has been found to be quantitatively important in economics research:

- (a) The "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative is a three-sentence summary of the findings from Autor et al. (2013), that points to how the rise in imports from China negatively impacted the labor market outcomes of manufacturing workers in the US.

8. The 2021 survey platform can be accessed at: https://hbs.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_2h4BOo6l46Yzwpq

- (b) The “Trade Helps Jobs” narrative is a description of how the rise in imports from China led the US to specialize more in service sectors and in turn to an increase in the total number of jobs in the US economy, as established by Caliendo et al. (2019).
- (c) The “Trade Helps Prices” narrative discusses how the rise in imports from China led to lower prices, for both durable goods such as computers, electrical products, and furniture, and non-durable goods such as apparel. In the 2020 and 2021 runs on the survey, we also exposed participants to two variants of this treatment, that were similarly randomized to survey respondents. The first variant replaced the phrase “availability of cheaper goods” with “increased availability of goods”, to explore the possibility that the adjective “cheap” might have triggered negative connotations (e.g., associated with “low-quality”). The second variant did not mention “China”, referring instead to a generic increase in imports.
- (d) Starting in 2020, and following the resurgence in US import tariffs, we also introduced a “Tariff Hurts Prices” narrative based on the findings from Amiti et al. (2019). This describes how the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods, which incurred an estimated loss to US real income of \$1.4 billion per month.

To make the information as accessible as possible to the general public, each of these narratives includes text that is simplified to eliminate technical jargon, as well as a figure to visually illustrate the key trends over time with regard to either labor market outcomes or good prices. For example, in the “Trade Hurts Jobs” treatment, we reproduced Figure 1 from Autor et al. (2013), which overlays the increase in imports from China between 1987-2007 with the contemporaneous decline in manufacturing employment as a share of US employment. Likewise, in the “Trade Helps Jobs” treatment, we created an analogous figure in which the decline in manufacturing employment was replaced in the illustration by the rise in total US nonfarm employment instead. It should be stressed that each of the narratives is evidence-based; in particular, we do not deliberately expose participants to misinformation, falsified accounts, or hypothetical statements. The accompanying tone of each narrative also seeks to be neutral and factual. (The narratives are reproduced in the Appendix.)

Part 3: Policy Preferences. The third section of the survey then solicits preferences over economic policies. The questions we focus on when constructing a measure of preferences for protection are the following:

- (a) “Do you support placing more limits on import?” Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No, and “If Yes, on which countries?”

- (b) “Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate to reduce imports?” Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No, and “If yes, what would you like the US tariff rate on imports to be?”
- (c) “Would you support the US signing free trade agreements with more foreign countries?” Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No.
- (d) A simple choice of policy preferences between “higher taxes on top income earners” and “higher tariff rates on imports from foreign countries”; respondents were given the option to select just one of these two policies, or to respond “both” or “neither”.

We also sought a better gauge of how strong the preference for protectionism is relative to other policies that can help to address labor market outcomes. Toward this end, we included a question in which respondents are presented with a menu of eight policy options, and then asked to identify their three “Most Preferred” and three “Least Preferred” policies. The eight policy options are presented on the survey screen in a random order, to avoid possible biases towards policies based on the order in which they appear as response options:⁹

- (a) Higher taxes on top income earners;
- (b) Higher minimum wage;
- (c) More benefits for the unemployed (e.g., unemployment insurance);
- (d) Improving education and worker training;
- (e) More limits on imports from foreign countries (e.g., higher tariffs on imports);
- (f) Weakening the U.S. dollar, so that U.S. exports are more competitive;
- (g) Exiting from existing free trade agreements;
- (h) More limits on immigration.

Part 4: Validate and Explain Choices. Starting in the 2020 survey run, we included a fourth section that seeks to validate how well the participants engaged with the survey as well as to solicit their reasons if they had selected “More Limits on Imports” as a top-three preferred policy. The key questions here include:

- (a) Did the information that you read earlier in this survey affect your views on trade policy (i.e., the use of tariffs or limits on imports)? (Responses were recorded on a Likert scale with five options, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.)
- (b) The information that I read earlier in this survey was on the topic of:

9. This follows recommendations of survey practice to avoid choice biases that could arise from the order of response options; see: <https://www.qualtrics.com/support/survey-platform/survey-module/question-options/choice-randomization/>.

- the relationship between trade and prices
- the relationship between trade and technology
- the relationship between trade and jobs
- I did not receive information on any of the above

(c) Why “More Limits on Imports”? Survey participants who selected this as a top-three preferred policy were directed to this follow-up question where they were reminded of their policy choice. They were then asked to assess the extent to which each of the following reasons might explain their selection of “More Limits on Imports”: (Responses were recorded on a Likert scale with five options, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.)

- I am concerned about US imports from countries such as China.
- Imports are a potential threat to US national security.
- Imports are often of lower quality.
- Even if imports have also helped to create jobs in certain sectors (lower goods prices), there are other more important concerns.
- I was persuaded that imports have hurt jobs in the US (have lowered goods prices for Americans).
- Imports often compete for jobs with US workers.

We engaged the services of a professional survey company (Qualtrics) to administer the survey online to a nationally representative sample of the US population (by age, gender, race, education, and region).¹⁰ In total, we conducted four annual runs of the survey, which we group in 3 rounds as described below.¹¹

The first round of the survey consists of two runs launched in July 2018 and April 2019, which yielded a total of 2,277 usable observations.¹² These surveys offered the “Trade Hurts

10. The sampling quotas requested were: (i) by gender, female: 50.8%, male: 49.2%; (ii) by age, 18-24: 12.8%, 25-34: 17.7%, 35-44: 16.7%, 45-54: 17.7%, 55-64: 16.4%, 65+: 18.8%; (iii) by race, non-Hispanic White: 61.9%, non-Hispanic Black: 12.3%, Hispanic: 17.4%, Asian: 5.3%, Other: 3.2%; (iv) by education, HS diploma/GED or less: 40.8%, some college (no degree): 20.9%, college degree: 26.9%, graduate degree: 11.4%; and (v) by region, Midwest: 21.33%, Northeast: 18.02%, South: 37.27%, West: 23.38%. Participants who completed the survey received a compensation of around \$2.00 each. We did not seek to assemble a longitudinal panel of the same individuals due to budget constraints and low re-contact rates.

11. We administered an early version of the survey through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in late February-mid March of 2018 to a sample of 2,510 respondents. An advantage of MTurk is its ready pool of respondents, but the platform also faces inherent sample selection issues as we found that the MTurk participants were younger, more educated, more likely to be employed, and more likely to have supported the Democratic candidate in the 2016 presidential election than the national average. Nonetheless, the baseline results were similar (available on request).

12. More specifically, the round 1 sample was composed of around 550 observations assigned to each of the “Control”, “Trade Hurts Jobs”, “Trade Helps Jobs”, and “Trade Helps Prices” treatments.

Jobs,” “Trade Helps Jobs,” and “Trade Helps Prices” treatments; we have grouped these two pre-pandemic runs of the survey as a single “round” due to the smaller number of observations relative to later editions.¹³ The second-round survey was conducted from April-June 2020 to a sample of 6,009 participants; this included the same treatments as in round 1 plus the “Tariff Hurts Prices” narrative, on recent evidence concerning the new US tariffs and their impact on goods prices. This second round also included mixed treatments that combined both the “Trade Hurts Jobs” and “Trade Helps Jobs” narratives, as well as the two variants of the “Trade Helps Prices” narratives.¹⁴ The third round, performed in April 2021, yielded a sample of 4,058 participants¹⁵; this consisted of all the previous treatments and additional questions with respect to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and US government’s relief packages.¹⁶ The different rounds yielded a total sample of 12,344 survey respondents. In the analysis, we account for and explore the different timings of the three rounds when assessing the effects of the information treatments.

In addition to the information collected in the survey, we also obtain data on the counties in which the respondents are located. We then merge in the identities of the counties for the majority of the respondents on the basis of the city or town names which they provided.¹⁷ This allows us to subsequently merge in a set of location characteristics from standard sources of county-level data for between 96.9% and 98.6% of our observations, depending on

13. In the first run of the survey in July 2018, we also included a “It’s not Trade, it’s Technology” narrative that presented the argument that “Technological advances in recent decades, such as computerization and automation, have tended to favor skilled workers, while replacing some jobs that used to be performed by unskilled workers.” We did not find any statistically significant effects with this information treatment, and omitted it from subsequent survey runs to focus on the jobs- and prices-related treatments.

14. The round 2 sample was composed of around 800 observations each assigned to the “Control”, “Trade Hurts Jobs”, “Trade Helps Jobs”, “Trade Helps Prices”, and “Tariff Hurts Prices” treatments, together with about 500 observations each assigned to the “Trade Hurts Helps Jobs”, “Trade Helps Hurts Jobs”, “Trade Helps Prices China”, and “Trade Helps Prices Cheaper” narratives.

15. The round 3 sample was composed of around 450 observations assigned to each of the “Control”, “Trade Hurts Jobs”, “Trade Helps Jobs”, “Trade Helps Prices”, “Tariff Hurts Prices”, “Trade Hurts Helps Jobs”, “Trade Helps Hurts Jobs”, “Trade Helps Prices China”, and “Trade Helps Prices Cheaper” treatments.

16. These questions include, for example, “whether countries should be able to restrict the movement of people across borders,” “whether countries should avoid imposing tariffs on imports of medical products and health equipment,” “whether countries should avoid imposing tariffs on imports of goods that are needed in supply chains,” “whether countries should be able to restrict the export of medical products and health equipment,” “whether countries should keep the manufacture of goods that are needed in supply chains at home and avoid moving production abroad,” and “how has the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic affected your views of China?”

17. This was done via a Stata fuzzy merge command (`reclink`). To improve the merge rate, observations with a fuzzy merge score of lower than 0.93 were double-checked manually to see if the name of the city or town could be identified after correcting for spelling errors, the use of abbreviations (e.g., “St.” versus “Saint”), and differences between colloquial and formal naming conventions (e.g., “St. Pete” versus “St. Petersburg”). For a number of observations where there was potential ambiguity, the IP address coordinates were used to corroborate the likely location of the respondent.

the survey run.¹⁸

4 Broad Patterns of Policy Preferences

In this section, we provide a first look at the broad patterns of policy preferences emerging from the data collected, by examining the composition of the samples with regard to respondent characteristics and expressed preferences over policies.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for each of the three survey rounds on a range of underlying characteristics of the participants. This includes background biographic information (e.g., gender, age, race), socio-economic characteristics (e.g., education, household income, employment), socio-political attitudes (e.g., candidate supported in the 2016 presidential election), and news consumption patterns. With the information provided by the respondents on their state and city/town of residence, we were further able to merge in location characteristics at the county level; this includes various economic conditions that the respondent would in principle be exposed to, such as the college educated share of the population aged 25 or older (from the American Community Survey), the local share of manufacturing in total employment (from the County Business Patterns dataset), the Autor et al. (2013) China import shock (from the 2000s), and a dummy variable for whether the location is an urban county (from the US Census).¹⁹ Across the columns in Table 1, the respondent and location characteristics are broadly similar across survey rounds.

Turning to policy preferences, Table 2 (top panel) presents the declared support for protectionist policies when this is posed in a direct “Yes/No” question. When phrased in this manner, a fairly high share of respondents tended to agree with placing more limits on imports (57-62%, across the three survey rounds). Note, however, that the share of respondents favoring alternative policies, such as minimum wages and progressive taxation was consistently higher (65%-80%).²⁰

The lower panel summarizes the frequency with which each of the eight options was identified among the respondents’ three most-preferred economic policies. While the means reported here are unconditional – in that they are calculated pooling across all survey respon-

18. As a check of the data consistency and quality, we dropped a small fraction of observations from each survey sample that had respondent IP address coordinates originating from outside the United States. The fraction of observations dropped was less than 0.3% for the entire sample. We also removed observations that took less than half the median completion time to ensure a reasonable amount of time spent in completing the survey.

19. The college share and manufacturing share variables are constructed for the year 2016.

20. Interestingly, between 65-68% of the survey participants also favored signing new free trade agreements. It is possible that some respondents may not see raising limits on imports and signing more free trade agreements as contradictory, for example since these moves could each be pursued with different foreign countries.

dents – they nevertheless bring to light several stylized facts. Anti-global policies received a lower level of respondents’ support when compared against alternative tax or labor market policies. The share of respondents who selected “More limits on imports” was in the 20-30% range, while the corresponding shares that picked “More limits on immigration” was about 35%. Only around 10-13% of respondents identified “Exiting from free trade agreements” as a preferred course of action.

In contrast, policies to “Improve education and training”, “Higher minimum wage”, and “Higher taxes on top income earners” (i.e., more progressive taxes) each received broader support, from about 50-60% of the respondents. Not all public assistance programs received high support though, as only about a quarter of respondents identified “More unemployment benefits” as a preferred policy. The option that received the least support was to “Weaken the US Dollar” (4-7% only).²¹ Of note, the ranking of the most-preferred policies was stable across survey runs. Breaking down these preferences over policy by location, the variation across regions is broadly consistent with the well-known geographic divisions in support for the Republican versus Democratic party (available on request). On a separate note, rounds 2 and 3 of the survey uncover a slight uptick in preferences for “More Limits on Imports”: 23% of participants selected this as a top-three policy in 2018-2019, rising to 27% in 2020 and 28% in 2021. This came at the expense of a corresponding waning in support for a “Higher minimum wage”, and for “Improving education and training”.

A useful point to highlight is the contrast in level of support for protection expressed in the direct “Yes/No” questions, as compared to the shares who picked these among their top-three preferred policies in the lower panel. The latter question format appears to be useful in teasing out how anti-global policies appear to receive less support relative to alternative actions, once respondents are asked to consciously prioritize and rank from a menu of policy options.

5 Baseline Evidence

5.1 Empirical Specification

We turn now to the task of identifying whether and how much the information treatments affected respondents’ policy preferences. We evaluate this formally by adopting the following

21. The summary statistics based on the survey question on one’s least-preferred policies yielded a consistent message, with “Improve education and training”, “Higher minimum wage”, and “Higher taxes on top income earners” being least likely to be selected.

regression specification:

$$\mathbf{1}(Policy_i) = \sum_{b=1}^B \beta_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbf{1}(Policy_i)$ is a dummy variable for whether respondent i expressed support for the policy measure in question, while the $\mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b)$'s are dummy variables for whether the respondent received the survey format that contained information treatment b . We denote the control group that received no information by $b = 0$, and this is the omitted treatment category in (1). The coefficients β_b , for $b = 1, \dots, B$, therefore capture the effects of the respective information treatments relative to the control group. These can be accorded a causal interpretation, given the randomization of respondents to treatment narratives. (Appendix Tables 1a-1c confirm that within each survey round, the randomization achieved balance in respondent characteristics across the treatment subsamples.)

We include on the right-hand side of (1) a large vector of controls, X_i , to account for any other systematic correlations between these observed respondent characteristics and expressed policy preferences. This includes: (i) standard biographic variables (such as gender, age group, race, education, employment status, region of birth); (ii) prior political position (namely, the party candidate supported in the 2016 presidential election); and (iii) news consumption habits (i.e., frequency and main news sources). To capture the effects of these preceding variables as flexibly as possible, we control for each using a set of dummies based on the response options from the associated survey question.

We further control in (1) for the role of several county-level socio-economic conditions, specifically how these might have shaped respondents' views towards policy. As described earlier, the county variables we control for are the college-educated share, the manufacturing share in local employment, the Autor et al. (2013) China import shock, and an urban dummy. Each of these location characteristics is constructed at the county-level, except for the China import shock measures which are at the more aggregated commuting-zone level.

Note that the underlying randomization implies that the assignment of information treatments should be orthogonal to any respondent or location characteristics, and so whether or not we control for the vector X_i should not undermine the consistency of the β_b 's as estimates of the information treatment effects. That said, we find it useful to control for these characteristics, to provide a point of comparison with what the prior literature has found with regard to correlates of preferences for trade protection.

Last but not least, we also account for several survey features. When the dependent variable is the indicator for whether "More Limits on Imports" was selected as a top-three preferred policy, we include a "randomization order" variable whose value is equal to the

position (i.e., first to eighth) in which “More Limits on Imports” appeared to the individual respondent in the menu of eight policy options. This is meant to control for any tendency towards picking policies that appear earlier in the list of response options. We also include dummy variables for whether the survey was taken on a mobile device (to control for possible systematic differences across mobile and non-mobile device users), as well as for the week the response was recorded (to capture forces related to the weekly news cycle).

In what follows, we cross-validate our findings by using an array of dependent variables that are constructed from the various survey questions that speak to respondents’ trade policy preferences. Specifically, we run logit regressions based on equation (1) using in turn the following variables as $\mathbf{1}(Policy_i)$: (i) whether a “Yes” answer was recorded on the binary-response question “Do you support placing more limits on imports?”; (ii) whether a “Yes” answer was recorded on the binary-response question “Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate?”; (iii) whether a “Yes” answer was recorded on the binary-response question “Would you support signing more FTAs?”; (iv) whether the respondent selected “Higher tariffs on imports from foreign countries” or “Both” (higher tariffs and higher taxes on top income earners) on the question soliciting preferences over these two policies; and (v) whether the respondent selected “More limits on imports” as one of his/her three “Most Preferred” out of the list of eight policies. When presenting results from these logit regressions, we will report marginal effects that are evaluated setting the information treatment dummies $\mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b)$ to zero and the respondent characteristics in X_i to their in-sample mean values.

In addition, we report results run via OLS using the first principal component of (i)-(v) as the dependent variable; we subtract the binary-response to the question “Would you support signing more FTAs?” from one prior to taking this first principal component. This yields a measure that is increasing in the intensity of individuals’ preferences for protection, that in principle dampens the effect of measurement error that might be inherent in the responses to any single survey question. We report throughout standard errors that are clustered by county of residence. Note that the β_b coefficients obtained from these regressions should be interpreted as information treatment effects holding the extensive set of respondent characteristics constant.

5.2 Effects of Baseline Treatments

We start by analyzing the effects of the information treatments across different rounds of the survey, specifically round 1 (2018-2019) and rounds 2-3 (2020-2021). A comparison of the two sets of results helps to shed light on any common features that are robust across the independently-drawn samples before and after the outbreak of the pandemic.

Baseline Round. Table 3 presents the baseline results obtained from round 1. Relative to the control group, the group receiving the “Trade Hurts Job” treatment exhibits significantly stronger preferences for protectionist trade policies. Exposure to evidence that describes how trade has led to manufacturing job losses raises the respondents’ propensity to support “More limits on imports” (Column 1), “US tariff rate increase ” (Column 2), and “Higher tariffs” (Column 3), as well as to pick “More limits on imports” as one of their most-preferred policies (Column 5). At the same time, the “Trade Hurts Job” treatment lowers the likelihood of respondents supporting a policy of entering more FTAs, although this effect falls short of statistical significance (Column 4). A similar finding holds when using the principal component response in Column 6: individuals exposed to the “Trade Hurts Job” information overall display stronger support for protectionist trade policies. In terms of quantitative implications, the “Trade Hurts Job” coefficient of 0.282 in Column 6 implies a treatment effect that shifts preferences towards favoring more protection that is about 1/3 the magnitude of the effect of self-identifying as a Republican presidential candidate supporter.

In sharp contrast, we find that communicating evidence that “Trade Helps Jobs” had no significant effect on trade policy preferences.²² Moreover, exposing participants to the “Trade Helps Prices” information leads to puzzling results: learning evidence showing imports have contributed to lower prices raises the propensity of respondents to favor more limits imports (Column 1), supporting higher tariffs (Column 3) and to select limits on imports as a top-three preferred policy (Column 5). The coefficient estimate when using the first principal component variable in Column 6 is also statistically significant and quantitatively comparable to the effect of exposure to the “Trade Hurts Jobs” information.

The above results suggest that, contrary to expectations, receiving information on the impacts of trade can trigger increased preferences for trade protection, regardless of the positive or negative nature of the impact presented. We explore potential explanations to this puzzling finding in the next subsection by introducing variants of the “Trade Hurts Jobs,” “Trade Helps Jobs,” and “Trade Helps Prices” treatments in rounds 2-3 of our survey experiments.

The 2020-2021 Rounds. In April-June 2020 and April 2021, we conducted additional rounds of the survey to a sample of 10,067 participants and offered the same treatments as round 1 and a new treatment with the “Tariff Hurts Prices” narrative discussing recent evidence concerning the new US tariffs and their impacts on prices. These additional rounds

22. In early rounds, we found a “It’s Technology” narrative, which discussed how automation and other technological progress have led to manufacturing job losses, lowered support for “Higher taxes on top earners”, but had little clear bearing otherwise on the remaining policies.

of the survey enable us to examine whether individuals’ responses to trade-outcome information may have varied even as the pandemic disrupted the global economy, the US-China tariffs remained in place, and the US government was rolling out economic stimulus policies. Would individuals’ preferences for economic policy become more or less elastic to information about the pros and cons of freer trade during this extremely turbulent period? To this end, additional questions were also included to measure how each individual’s view on trade policy might have been directly affected by the pandemic and economic policy.

Table 2 compares the unconditional means of expressed policy preferences in 2018-2019, 2020, and 2021. Overall, the different rounds display broadly similar patterns in support for trade protection and other economic policy instruments. For example, the responses to “Most Preferred Policies” show a similar policy ranking, with “Higher minimum wage” consistently ranked on the top followed by “Improvement on education” and “More progressive taxes” and with “Weaken the USD” and “Exiting from FTAs” consistently ranked on the bottom. Notably though, the support for more limits on imports rose in both the binary and ranking questions: for example, in the pre-pandemic round, 23% of the respondents ranked “More limits on foreign imports” as one of their most preferred policies, while that share increased to 27-28% in 2020-2021.

Turning to the regression analysis, Table 4 presents results when pooling the Control group with observations that received jobs-related information treatments, while Table 5 presents the findings when pooling the Control group with respondents who received prices-related narratives instead. As discussed earlier, rounds 2 and 3 of the survey incorporate several variants of the information narratives as additional treatment groups, and so we have opted to break up the analysis in this manner to avoid cluttering a single regression with up to eight treatment dummies.

When examining the jobs-related treatment effects, we find that all the baseline results documented in 2018-2019 continue to hold broadly in 2020-2021 as shown in Table 4 (Columns 1-6). Once again, the “Trade Hurts Jobs” treatment exerts a particularly noticeable effect. Exposing participants to the “Trade Hurts Jobs” information raised their propensity to select more protectionist policies, while communicating “Trade Helps Jobs” had no significant effects. In Table 5, we once again replicate the puzzling finding that the “Trade Helps Prices” narrative significantly *raises* preferences for protectionism, albeit with the magnitude of this treatment effect being about half the size of that displayed in Table 3. The “Tariff Hurts Prices” narrative induces a similar response to that of “Trade Helps Prices”: when provided with the converse information that tariffs have hurt US consumers, participants’ preferences also shift towards voicing more support for limits on imports. The persistence of this finding – that narratives related to how trade would benefit goods prices

nevertheless induce protectionist reactions – thus appears to be a robust empirical regularity that cannot be easily rejected as an isolated result.

It would also be useful to validate the above result by examining whether the participants in these recent rounds believed that the evidence-based information indeed affected their views on trade policy. Column 0a in both Tables 4 and 5 show that to be the case. When asked the degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected the participant’s views on trade policy, the respondents exposed to the “Trade Hurts Jobs”, the “Trade Helps Prices” or the “Tariff Hurts Prices” treatment all tended to agree while those receiving the “Trade Helps Jobs” treatment did not. Note that participants exposed to the “Trade Hurts Jobs”, the “Trade Helps Prices”, or the “Tariff Hurts Prices” treatment were also more likely to have a negative view on the impact of trade for most Americans (Column 0b).²³

The results from the 2021-2022 rounds indicate that despite all the disruptions from the pandemic and ongoing trade war, respondents’ trade policy responses to information remain remarkably stable. Information on manufacturing job loss from trade triggers increased preferences for trade protection, while alternative information on potential gains from trade does not lead to symmetric reactions.

Respondent Characteristics. Before moving on to the variants of the treatments, it is helpful at this juncture to briefly discuss what the regression findings in Tables 4-5 suggest about the correlation between respondent characteristics and policy preferences. We report the full set of coefficients estimated from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5 respectively in Appendix Table 2. It appears that older individuals are more likely to support limits on imports, with the effects increasing steadily across older age bands.

Consistent with previous research, political affiliation is important for explaining support for protectionism: participants who supported the Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential election are more likely to favor import restrictions, with the opposite true for Democratic supporters (the omitted category here is respondents who indicated support for neither the Republican nor the Democratic candidate). The effect of education was not consistent across rounds and only significant at the 10% level in some specifications (Column 2). Interestingly, the regression results also show that the consumption of Fox News is positively correlated with support for restrictions on imports. Note too that the “randomization or-

23. Appendix Table 3 presents additional robustness analysis based on alternative samples. For example, our results continue to hold when the regressions are run on observations from rounds 2 and 3 separately. We have also experimented with different ways of combining the information on trade policy preferences across the individual questions, such as using an unweighted average, constructing a dummy variable equal to one if a protectionist answer was recorded on at least three of the five constituent question, or adopting a factor analysis approach; these continue to deliver results that are very consistent with our baseline.

der” variable was also consistently negative and often statistically significant, pointing to the usefulness of the randomized response order as a design feature. We find little evidence that exposure through one’s county location to the manufacturing industry affects trade policy preferences: The coefficient of the 2000s Autor et al. (2013) China import shock is imprecisely estimated. While the share of manufacturing in employment has a positive correlation with preferences for import restrictions, this is not strongly significant.

5.3 Variant Treatments

In this subsection, we investigate whether the timing and the specific composition of the information treatments may have influenced the responses by exploring additional rounds and adapted versions of the baseline treatments.

Sequencing the “Jobs” Treatments

Next, we examine whether the “Trade Helps Jobs” information, while having no significant effect on respondents when presented independently, may help mitigate the effect of the opposite narrative. How would individuals respond to a balanced set of information?

In Table 4, we hence evaluate the effects of providing both the “Trade Hurts Jobs” and “Trade Helps Jobs” treatments, in alternative ordering. We find that exposure to the “Trade Helps Jobs” information after learning “Trade Hurts Jobs” weakly diminishes respondents’ protectionist responses. Interestingly, exposure to the “Trade Hurts Jobs” information after being communicated “Trade Helps Jobs” contributes to a similar likelihood of selecting “More limits on imports” as receiving only the “Trade Hurts Jobs” narrative. One interpretation of these findings is that the ordering of the information may play a role in individuals’ response to information and the “Trade Helps Jobs” narrative can potentially help to counteract the effect of the preceding, negative narrative.

Varying the “Price” Treatments

Now we turn to the puzzling result in the baseline survey in which the “Trade Helps Prices” treatment raises the respondents’ likelihood of selecting trade restrictive policies. To better understand potential causes of this surprising effect, we explore in rounds 2-3 two variations of the information treatment.

Specifically, one potential explanation is that participants may associate the phrase “cheap” with “low quality” and hence respond negatively to the evidence on lower prices. To investigate this, we adapted the baseline treatment by replacing references to “availability of cheaper goods” with “increased availability of goods.” We refer to this as the “Trade Helps Prices China” treatment, as it retains the mention of China in the narrative. Table 5 shows

that removing the phrase “cheap” from the information does not alter the treatment effect significantly.

Next, we explore another potential explanation that may underlie the unexpected results: a “China” factor. Amid the ongoing trade war and continuing tension between China and the US, it is plausible that the US public could react adversely to any information pertaining to China, even if the information describes the benefits of Chinese imports. To examine this particular channel in explaining respondents’ attitudes toward trade and its price benefits, we removed the mention of “China” in another adapted version of the price treatment. We refer to this as the “Trade Helps Prices Cheaper” treatment, since it retains the adjective “cheap” while maintaining the references to China. The results in Table 5 confirm this hypothesis: the treatment containing “China” leads to the strongest, protectionist responses. This finding is echoed in Columns 0a and 0b when the respondents are asked whether the treatments affected their views on trade policies and whether they believed trade helped most Americans. The group receiving the price treatment with the mention of China did not believe their views were affected by the “Trade Helps Prices” information and was more likely to view trade as harmful for most Americans. We dig deeper into this “China” factor in Section 6.2.

Finally, we investigate whether participants may respond differently to the price treatment if the price effects of imports were presented in an opposite manner. In particular, while individuals may place little weight on the price saving effect of trade, we ask next if they may be more concerned about price hikes as a result of tariffs. To explore that, we provide a “Tariff Hurts Prices” treatment (Treatment 4) which describes the evidence from Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019) showing that the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods and lowered US real income by \$1.4 billion per month. Despite that many participants believed the information affected their views on trade policy, they continued to select protectionist policies.

Overall, looking across the different rounds and variants of the survey treatments, two takeaways consistently stand out. First, the “Trade Hurts Jobs” treatment appears to have a particularly robust ability to shift respondents towards favoring more trade protection. This effect may be partially counteracted when the individuals are presented with a balanced set of information describing both the job losses and gains from imports. Second, contrary to expectations, information on the price benefits of trade or the price costs of tariffs does not lower support for trade protection; instead, they both induce protectionist responses, especially when the information pertains to China.

5.4 Attention and Information Recall

One concern that may arise in interpreting the documented responses so far is the degree of attention and care that respondents actually paid as they completed the survey. We investigate the respondents' ability to recall the treatment received and its potential impact on treatment responses. Table 6 presents the end-of-survey recollection of treatment information. The regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the control group), those who received the jobs-related treatments (Columns 1 and 2), and those who received the prices-related treatments (columns 3 and 4). Despite the length of the survey, respondents, on average, appeared to be able to recall the basic content of the information, that is, whether the survey they received contained information "about jobs", "about prices", or "others" and the probability of correctly recalling information did not vary across treatments. This suggests that the adverse response to the positive trade narrative is unlikely to be driven by participants' misunderstanding of the treatment.²⁴

Nonetheless, we show in Table 7 that attention matters. In particular, as shown in Columns 1 and 3, respondents spending a longer duration on the survey were more likely to correctly recall the nature of the information. Further, respondents that received the "Trade Helps Jobs" information were less likely to prefer trade protection the longer they spent reading the survey. This can be seen in Column 2 where we interact the "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment with an "above-median treatment duration" variable, an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent spent an above-median amount of time on the information treatment screen page relative to all respondents who received the same information treatment. Respondents with an "above-median" treatment duration appeared to have better comprehended, and more positively responded to, all the different variants of the "Trade Helps Jobs" information. Note that for the other treatments, "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", "Trade Helps Prices China", and "Tariff Hurts Prices", even those who spent above median time on the information continued to express more support for protectionism. These results suggest that the only area in which attention and effort may influence people's reactions to information is positive job-related information. For all the other types of information, attention and effort do not alter individuals' instinctive responses.²⁵

24. Results are robust to including a dummy variable for whether the respondent was shown a followup "reasons" question, which could have a reminder effect.

25. Round 2 of the survey took place during the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic and also overlapped with political events related to the Black Lives Matter movement. Appendix Table 4 explores whether this could have affected the attention of survey participants. We control here for a county-level measure of Safegraph individual mobility that are constructed by the data provider from cell phone signal data as a proxy for the severity of local Covid-19 lockdowns. We also control for a measure of county-level Black Lives Matter protests. Neither of these controls has a significant effect on preferences over trade policy, nor do they affect the information treatment effect results.

In the next section, we turn to alternative mechanisms that may help explain the consistent preferences for trade protection, irrespective of the information treatments.

6 Exploring the Mechanisms

Why do both the “Trade Hurts Jobs” and “Trade Helps Prices” treatments provoke similar protectionist responses? In order to shed light on this, we seek to explore potential mechanisms underlying the documented effects by augmenting the previous regression analysis (1) with interaction terms between the “Trade Hurts Jobs”/“Trade Helps Prices” dummies and respondent characteristics. In particular, we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{1}(Policy_i) = & \sum_{b=1}^B \alpha_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) \times x_i \\ & + \sum_{b=1}^B \beta_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $x_i \in X_i$. The objective here is to explore various channels through which the “Trade Hurts Jobs” narrative might be operating in influencing support for trade policies, to the extent that these mechanisms can be reflected in or proxied by respondent characteristics x_i .

We focus on several key potential motivations of policy preferences which include: (a) economic self-interest, such as those derived from personal exposure to economic outcomes of trade (via industry of employment, local import penetration) and the respondent’s education level; (b) sociotropic concerns, such as those related to concerns regarding the distribution of income inequality and trust in government; (c) identity politics such as reinforcing prior political positions and views; and (d) behavioral factors, in particular, the degree of loss aversion. Note, however, that these categories are certainly not mutually exclusive; some variables such as education and sociotropic views may influence individual preferences through multiple mechanisms. In Tables 8 and 9 below, we report in the upper panel the results from interaction specifications involving the jobs-related treatments, while the lower panel presents the analogous specifications for the prices-related treatment dummies. For brevity, we present estimates of (2) from OLS regressions using the first principal component measure of preferences for protection as the dependent variable.

6.1 Economic and Non-economic Mechanisms

Economic Self-Interest

Exposure to Import Competition. We first analyze whether exposure to adverse effects of import competition due to one’s industry of employment or geographic location might lead to resonance with the “Trade Hurts Jobs” information. In particular, based on classical trade theories (such as Stolper-Samuelson), respondents working in the manufacturing sector or living in areas with greater import penetration might, in principle, be more responsive to the “Trade Hurts Jobs” treatment, and by extension, be less receptive to information about the benefits of trade. We test this hypothesis in Table 8 by interacting the respective treatment dummies with an indicator variable for whether the respondent is from the manufacturing sector (Column 1, 7), and with the Autor et al. (2013) measure of China import penetration during the 2000s (Column 2, 8), respectively. We do not find significant evidence in support of this channel. Respondents’ employment in manufacturing or exposure to Chinese import competition explains neither overall preferences for trade protection nor reactions to any of the treatments.

Education. Might education temper protectionist tendencies? In Columns 3 and 9 of Table 8, we explore this possibility by introducing an interaction term between the treatments and a dummy for whether the respondent was a college graduate. Again, we find education to play no significant roles in both the level of protectionist tendency nor reactions to information.

In Table A.5 of the appendix, we examine additional proxies for economic self-interests including: household income, unemployment status, Chinese import penetration in the 1990s, and views on the impact of NAFTA on family. In general, none of these proxies for measuring economic self-interests exhibited significant effects with the information treatments.

Sociotropic Concerns

Income Inequality. In addition to economic self-interests, another category that might play a potential role in people’s policy preferences is sociotropic concerns. One hypothesis is that participants with stronger concerns regarding how big a problem inequality is in the US today may exhibit more willingness to adopt protectionist policies to address this problem. As seen in Columns 4 and 10 of Table 8, participants more concerned about income inequality are less likely to favor protectionist policies; instead, they tend to rank alternative economic policies such as more progressive taxes and a higher minimum wage higher on their policy choices (available on request). The interaction effects with the different treatments are again not significant.

Trust in Government. Another hypothesis on preferences for trade protection (especially

relative to alternative policy instruments) concerns a potential lack of trust in government. When individuals are less confident in the government’s ability to address negative economic outcomes of imports via domestic redistribution policies, they may opt for policies to restrict foreign competition instead. For example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) show that the low trust in government can explain the lack of responsiveness in individuals’ preference for redistribution policies even when made aware of the severity of income inequality. This motivates us to examine here whether distrust in governments may feed into more protectionist tendencies, irrespective of information treatments. Columns 5 and 11 of Table 8 offers support to the above hypothesis. We find that while less trust in government leads to overall weaker preferences over the use of trade policy, respondents reporting less trust are more likely to prefer trade protection (as opposed to alternative policy instruments) when receiving the “Trade Hurts Jobs” information.

We also consider how a dissatisfaction with the US Job Market may explain reactions to the information and find no significant differences (Columns 6 and 12). This is similarly true for other proxies for sociotropic concerns, as seen in Appendix Table 5, including whether one views one’s job as giving a sense of identity, willingness to pay more for US brands, trust in foreigners, and a lack of confidence in children’s future.

Identity Politics

Could the treatment effects be driven by the role of information in reinforcing or even provoking one’s prior beliefs? Instead of being swayed by the evidence, the respondents may simply react to the information following their priors.

Reinforcing and Provoking Prior Belief. To examine this hypothesis and proxy for political priors, we use information on whether the respondent supported the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate in the 2016 election and the political leaning of the newspapers consumed by the respondent. As reported in Table 9, we find that first, respondents who supported the Republican candidate in 2016 exhibit significantly stronger preferences for trade protection, and that Republican support appears to accentuate the information treatment effects associated with the jobs-related treatments, particularly the mixed treatments where both “Trade Helps Jobs” and “Trade Hurts Jobs” are conveyed (Columns 1 and 6) On the other hand, respondents who self-report supporting the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 are less likely to voice a preference for protection after being presented with information that “Trade Hurts Jobs” or with information that trade has beneficial effects on goods prices (Columns 2 and 7). Political identity in recent years in the US has also been strongly aligned with the news sources that individuals follow. We therefore explore in Columns 3 and 8 a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent supported the Republican

presidential candidate and 2016 and reports following right-leaning news sources (including Fox News); the respondent characteristics in Columns 4 and 9 is a dummy variable for Democratic candidate support and following left-leaning news sources. The results are broadly consistent with the prior two columns in each panel, although the interaction coefficients are less precisely estimated.

An interpretation of the results is that information on trade outcomes, irrespective of gains or losses, tends to amplify and even provoke the trade policy preferences of respondents with a given prior derived from their political identity.

Behavioral Factor

After exploring the potential effects of economic, sociotropic, and political considerations, we next examine the role of behavioral factors, specifically, that of loss aversion in explaining the lack of symmetric reactions we documented earlier to the losses versus the gains from trade. As noted in an extensive literature led by the early work of Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Kahneman et al. (1991), individuals often place an asymmetric value on losses than gains: the disutility of giving up an object is perceived to be greater than the utility associated with acquiring it. Could this asymmetric value, also termed loss aversion, help explain the unexpected responses to the “Trade Helps Prices” treatment?

Loss Aversion To answer this question, we build on existing studies such as Kahneman et al. (1991) using lab experiments to measure individuals’ level of loss aversion and include three questions in the survey to assess the participant’s preferences to avoid losses relative to acquiring equivalent gains. Specifically, the following questions are included to measure the willingness to avoid paying versus the willingness to be paid: (i) which of the following would you prefer on your monthly cell phone statement: Avoiding an additional surcharge of \$100 vs Getting a discount of \$100? (ii) suppose you are given a cell phone with a market value around \$500 - please choose one of the options below to indicate the price you would be willing to pay if you had to purchase the cell phone yourself; and (iii) suppose you are given a cell phone with a market value around \$500 - please choose one of the options below to indicate the price you would be willing to accept if you were to sell the cell phone.

In line with the existing evidence, we document an asymmetry in people’s value on avoiding losses versus obtaining gains. Most respondents expressed stronger preferences for avoiding the additional surcharge than getting an equivalent discount and weaker willingness to pay than willingness to accept. In Columns 5 and 8 of Table 9, we show that while this loss aversion does not lead to different responses to the “Trade Hurts Jobs” treatment, it helps explain the protectionist response to the “Trade Helps Prices” treatment. Individuals exhibiting stronger degrees of loss aversion are more likely to ignore the price gains of imports

by preferring more limits on imports.

While the above mechanisms may certainly overlap and interact with one another, the findings highlight the particular importance of non-economic factors, especially that of identity politics and loss aversion, in explaining whether and how information might shift individuals' preferences for trade policies. Economic self-interests and the economic outcomes of trade as long emphasized in classical trade theories, in contrast, do not appear to directly make individuals more or less elastic to the information. Providing evidence-based information in the context of our experiment can trigger differential and sometimes unexpected reactions by reinforcing or provoking priors, especially those more right-leaning and more averse to losses.

6.2 Why Limit Imports? The Role of China

In the remainder of this section, we investigate another mechanism that may influence how people react to the information presented: the role of China. In Section 5.3, we have shown that excluding the word “China” from the price treatments leads to different and less protectionist reactions than the alternative price treatments. This hints that considerations about China may skew people's responses to trade outcome information.

To shed light on this, we requested explanations for choosing “More limits on imports” despite being exposed to positive effects of trade in the last section of the survey. Table 10 comprises ordered logit regressions on the reasons for picking “More limits on imports” as a top-three policy choice. The dependent variable in each column is an ordered categorical variable for the degree of agreement with the respective reason, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 5 being “Strongly Agree”.

We find that first, participants receiving the “Trade Helps Prices” and “Tariff Hurts Prices” treatments are not less unpersuaded. In fact, they are more likely to disagree with the statement that “they picked more limits on imports because they were not persuaded.” This piece of finding again confirms that the protectionist response to the “Trade Helps Prices” treatment documented earlier is not driven by the lack of persuasion in this particular treatment, but instead, as shown in Columns 3, 4 and 6, by the respondents' concerns over jobs, national security, and other important concerns. Similarly, participants informed with “Trade Helps Jobs” are not less unconvinced than participants told “Trade Hurts Jobs”. Instead, the former group preferred more limits on imports because of their particular concerns over imports from China, as shown in Column 5. Consistent with our results on the price treatment that eliminates the word “cheaper”, the quality of imports is not a major factor for selecting limits on imports.

Table 11 examines in more detail the characteristics of participants citing concerns over imports from China even when told the job benefits of Chinese imports. The dependent variable in the ordered logit regressions in this table is the degree of agreement (on a scale of 1-5) with the statement “I am concerned about US imports from countries such as China” as a reason for preferring more limits on imports. Columns 2-4 suggest that individuals more dissatisfied with the US job market, with lower trust in the government, and who supported the Republican candidate in 2016 are more likely to express concerns over Chinese imports and demand import limits despite the “Trade Helps Jobs” information. Consistent with our earlier evidence on identity politics, people’s political position and concerns about China can dominate their policy preferences when the information conveyed is contrary to their prior beliefs.

7 Discussions and Conclusion

Understanding how evidence-based information might shape individuals’ attitudes towards globalization and preferences over trade policies is critical, as research on trade policy decisions has typically assumed a full information environment and not taken into account possible biases in the information set that individuals are exposed to. We answer the question by developing and administering a series of survey experiments in 2018-2021 that contain randomized information treatments with concise summaries of evidence established by economic researchers on the gains and losses from trade.

Our results suggest that a “Trade Hurts Jobs” narrative shifts policy preferences towards being more protectionist, with an elasticity equivalent to a third of the effect of self-identified political position. In contrast, reactions to the job-gains-from-trade narrative are highly asymmetric and display no significant changes in trade policy preferences. More strikingly, exposing participants to the “Trade Helps Prices” information induces protectionist choices, with a magnitude quantitatively comparable to the effect of the “Trade Hurts Jobs” narrative. These findings are robust throughout the four-year period of the survey despite the unprecedented disruptions and fast-evolving political and economic movements. Taken together, our findings on these information treatment effects underscore the challenges of communicating the benefits of trade to the general public through the provision of evidence-based information.

When exploring underlying mechanisms, the analysis points to the particular role of non-economic factors, especially that of identity politics and loss aversion. Providing evidence-based information on either the loss or gains from trade triggers more protectionist reactions from those who were ex-ante self-identified as more right-leaning and more loss-averse. Con-

cerns over China have also been shown to act as a key factor in individuals' preferences for import limits regardless of the narrative presented. Economic self-interests long stressed in classical trade theories, in contrast, do not appear to make individuals more or less elastic to the information.

Our research sheds light on whether the provision of short evidence-based messaging can help to steer public preferences towards trade policy. The research design allows us to examine the relative ability of pro- versus anti-globalization narratives to gain traction with the general public. This could in turn inform the manner in which public education and messaging could be formulated, in order to more effectively communicate the benefits and costs of globalization to the public. Furthermore, if preferences for trade policies can be steered with simple information treatments in either intended or unintended directions, this would open avenues for rethinking the role that information and communication ought to play in the political economy of trade policy formation.

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A Appendix

A.1 Survey Treatments

The following preamble is presented at the start of each of the information treatment narratives (excluding the control group).

How have globalization and imports affected workers and households? Economic researchers have been studying this issue.

“Trade Hurts Jobs” narrative. Based on Autor, Dorn and Hanson (AER 2013):

A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This was a major force behind the fall in U.S. employment in the manufacturing sector, as the figure below shows. This led to weak wage growth for the middle- and low-income workers who used to hold these manufacturing jobs.





FIGURE I. IMPORT PENETRATION RATIO FOR US IMPORTS FROM CHINA (*left scale*), AND SHARE OF US WORKING-AGE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING (*right scale*)

“Trade Helps Jobs”. Based on Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro (2019):

A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This enabled the U.S. to specialize more in the service sectors in which

it is particularly productive, helping to increase the number of jobs in the U.S. economy. The figure below shows that the rise in total jobs over the last decades was substantial.




Starting in 2020, two additional treatments were included that mix the “Trade Hurts Jobs” and “Trade Helps Jobs” narratives:

- “Trade Hurts Helps Jobs”: “Trade Hurts Jobs” is presented first, followed by “Trade Helps Jobs”. The narratives are prefaced respectively by: “On the one hand, a line of recent research...” and “On the other hand, another line of recent research...”. (The figures from both narratives were included.)
- “Trade Helps Hurts Jobs”: This is analogous to “Trade Hurts Helps Jobs”, except that the order of the “Trade Hurts Jobs” and “Trade Helps Jobs” narratives are reversed.

“Trade Helps Prices”:

A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans. As imports from China increased, the prices of durable goods (computers, electrical products, furniture, etc.) and of nondurable goods such as apparel all saw declines, as the figure below shows.




Two variants of the “Trade Helps Prices” treatment were included in the survey starting in 2020:

- “Trade Helps Prices China”. The sentence: “This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans.” was replaced by: “This was a major force behind the increased availability of goods, which benefited Americans.” This wording was intended to replace the adjective “cheaper”, which could have triggered negative views towards imports due to the possible association of “cheaper” with imported goods being of “low quality”.
- “Trade Helps Prices Cheaper”. Any references to “China” were removed from the narrative, as follows: “A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result of globalization. This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans. As imports from the rest of the world increased, the prices of durable goods (computers, electrical products, furniture, etc.) and of nondurable goods such as apparel all saw declines, as the figure below shows.”

“Tariff Hurts Prices”:

A line of recent research has shown that the tariffs in 2018 have raised the cost of living in the United States. Over the course of 2018, the U.S. imposed tariffs on approximately \$400 billion of imports, particularly from China. This led to

significant increases in U.S. prices of tariff-related goods, as the figure below shows. It is estimated that this increase in prices lowered U.S. real income by \$1.4 billion per month.



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Core goods excludes food and energy; tariff-related goods prices includes laundry equipment and other appliances, furniture and bedding, housekeeping supplies, window and floor coverings, auto parts and bicycles.

Table 1
Summary Statistics: Respondent Characteristics by Survey Round

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-2019 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=5,926)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)
<u>Biodata</u>			
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.55 [16.78]	45.43 [16.58]	46.55 [16.69]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.67 [0.47]	0.62 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.33]	0.12 [0.32]
Race: Hispanic	0.17 [0.37]	0.13 [0.34]	0.18 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.27]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.28]
<u>Socio-Economic Characteristics</u>			
Household Income: Average \$ (approx.)	58,196.35 [47,585.01]	64,942.02 [54,165.25]	62,009.68 [49,462.06]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.81 [4.91]	11.56 [4.86]	11.71 [4.87]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.10 [0.30]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]
Employment Status: Employed	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.08 [0.26]	0.09 [0.28]	0.07 [0.26]
Employment Sector: Services	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]
Student?	0.03 [0.17]	0.04 [0.20]	0.04 [0.20]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	---	3.12 [1.47]	3.07 [1.50]
<u>Baseline Socio-Political Attributes</u>			
Presidential election 2016: Supported Dem.	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.43 [0.49]
Presidential election 2016: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.33 [0.47]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.01 [0.96]	1.96 [0.95]	1.97 [0.96]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.50 [1.05]	2.79 [1.13]	2.69 [1.11]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.48 [0.50]	0.35 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.16 [0.90]	3.35 [0.90]	3.31 [0.87]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.65 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]
<u>News consumption patterns</u>			
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.02 [2.47]	5.29 [2.34]	5.01 [2.43]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.29 [0.45]	0.26 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.17 [0.37]	0.21 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.16 [0.36]	0.17 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]
<u>Location Characteristics</u>			
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.56 [1.82]	2.57 [2.05]	2.54 [1.77]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]
Urban?	0.86 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]
<u>Survey Characteristics</u>			
Duration to complete (secs.)	726.81 [1,513.00]	912.00 [2,307.13]	887.60 [1,015.33]
Treatment duration	47.41 [65.92]	27.51 [84.76]	28.42 [58.29]
Mobile device?	0.61 [0.49]	0.70 [0.46]	0.58 [0.49]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumption, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 2
Expressed Policy Preferences: (Unconditional) Respondent Shares

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-2019 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=5,926)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)
Do you support placing more limits on imports?	0.57 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]
Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate?	0.28 [0.45]	0.25 [0.43]	0.25 [0.43]
Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?	0.44 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]
Prefer: More progressive taxes?	0.68 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]
Would you support signing more FTAs?	0.68 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]
Would you support a minimum wage?	0.78 [0.41]	0.80 [0.40]	0.74 [0.44]
Most Preferred Policies (pick 3 out of 8)			
More limits on foreign imports	0.23 [0.42]	0.27 [0.44]	0.28 [0.45]
Exiting from FTAs	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]
More limits on immigration	0.34 [0.47]	0.31 [0.46]	0.37 [0.48]
Weaken the USD	0.07 [0.26]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.28]
More progressive taxes	0.51 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Higher minimum wage	0.61 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.56 [0.50]
More unemployment benefits	0.30 [0.46]	0.34 [0.47]	0.29 [0.45]
Improvement on education	0.59 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]

Notes: Values reported are equal to the share of respondents pooled across all survey treatments who expressed a preference for the policy in question; standard deviations are in brackets. The shares for "Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?" and "Prefer: More progressive taxes?" do not sum to one, as respondents were allowed to select both policies in the survey question.

Table 3
Effect of Information Treatments on Preferences Towards Trade Policy
(Round 1, 2018-2019)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	More limits on imports	US tariff rate increase	Support higher tariff	Support more FTAs	Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	First principal component
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Treatment dummies:						
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.060* [0.032]	0.045* [0.026]	0.083*** [0.032]	-0.046 [0.030]	0.080*** [0.024]	0.282*** [0.076]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.007 [0.035]	0.033 [0.034]	0.064 [0.041]	0.017 [0.032]	0.040 [0.027]	0.135 [0.098]
Trade Helps Prices	0.057* [0.034]	0.018 [0.030]	0.071* [0.039]	-0.007 [0.032]	0.069** [0.028]	0.211** [0.089]
Most Pref., Randomization Order					-0.003 [0.003]	0.003 [0.011]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	-0.042 [0.029]	-0.043* [0.022]	-0.043 [0.026]	0.091*** [0.027]	-0.064*** [0.019]	-0.259*** [0.075]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.224*** [0.030]	0.147*** [0.028]	0.219*** [0.029]	-0.034 [0.029]	0.092*** [0.023]	0.728*** [0.081]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0970	0.103	0.0742	0.0746	0.0783	0.183
Log Likelihood	-1403	-1214	-1448	-1318	-1138	---

Notes: Based on the Round 1 (2018-2019) survey sample; includes respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; while that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are: individual dummies for gender, age group, race, level of studies, household income bins, employment status (including broad sector), survey answered on mobile device, BEA region of birth (including foreign-born category), frequency following current affairs, and news program source; county controls for share of college educated, ADH exposure to China imports (2000-2007), manufacturing share of employment, urban dummy, missing county information dummy; survey response week dummies. The "Most Pref., Randomization Order" variable is the rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" was presented among the eight policy options to the respondent in question. Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions, evaluated setting the treatment dummies uniformly to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 4
Exploring the "Jobs" Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Trade Policy Questions:	(0a)	(0b)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Did information affect views?	Impact of trade for most Americans?	More limits on imports	US tariff rate increase	Support higher tariff	Support more FTAs	Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	First principal component
	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Treatment dummies:								
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.040** [0.018]	-0.230*** [0.018]	0.076*** [0.020]	0.071*** [0.016]	0.051** [0.021]	-0.042** [0.020]	0.029 [0.018]	0.245*** [0.049]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.025 [0.018]	-0.011 [0.017]	-0.003 [0.022]	0.019 [0.016]	0.033 [0.022]	-0.000 [0.021]	-0.001 [0.018]	0.047 [0.053]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.039** [0.020]	-0.074*** [0.019]	0.025 [0.024]	0.030* [0.017]	0.030 [0.024]	-0.016 [0.022]	0.033* [0.020]	0.123** [0.060]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.046** [0.020]	-0.211*** [0.021]	0.099*** [0.021]	0.067*** [0.018]	0.029 [0.026]	-0.046** [0.022]	0.024 [0.019]	0.243*** [0.050]
Most Pref., Randomization Order							-0.012*** [0.002]	-0.025*** [0.007]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	0.090*** [0.015]	0.100*** [0.015]	0.010 [0.018]	0.026** [0.011]	-0.025 [0.020]	0.094*** [0.016]	-0.021 [0.013]	-0.054 [0.044]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.105*** [0.015]	0.038** [0.017]	0.232*** [0.020]	0.128*** [0.015]	0.148*** [0.019]	-0.028 [0.019]	0.162*** [0.018]	0.709*** [0.049]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0542	0.0651	0.0855	0.0956	0.0511	0.0662	0.0809	0.163
Log Likelihood	-6356	-7304	-3403	-2804	-3654	-3387	-2959	---

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; includes respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 0a is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Column 0b is an ordered categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that international trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); that in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; while that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Column 0a reports marginal effects from an ordered logit regression, on the predicted probability the respondent indicated "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree"; Column 0b reports marginal effects from an ordered logit regression, on the predicted probability the respondent indicated "Somewhat good" or "Extremely good"; Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 5
Exploring the "Prices" Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Trade Policy Questions:	(0a)	(0b)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Did information affect views?	Impact of trade for most Americans?	More limits on imports	US tariff rate increase	Support higher tariff	Support more FTAs	Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	First principal component
	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Treatment dummies:								
Trade Helps Prices	0.037** [0.018]	-0.052*** [0.017]	0.037* [0.021]	0.032** [0.015]	-0.008 [0.021]	-0.009 [0.020]	0.031* [0.016]	0.101** [0.050]
Trade Helps Prices China	0.006 [0.022]	-0.048** [0.019]	0.059** [0.024]	0.042** [0.019]	0.042* [0.024]	-0.029 [0.022]	0.048** [0.021]	0.199*** [0.057]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	-0.006 [0.019]	-0.031 [0.020]	0.034 [0.023]	0.046*** [0.018]	-0.001 [0.025]	-0.031 [0.022]	0.035* [0.021]	0.132** [0.059]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.042** [0.019]	-0.153*** [0.020]	0.025 [0.020]	0.030* [0.016]	0.030 [0.020]	-0.007 [0.019]	0.021 [0.018]	0.109** [0.050]
Most Pref., Randomization Order							-0.009*** [0.002]	-0.017** [0.008]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	0.100*** [0.014]	0.096*** [0.016]	-0.000 [0.018]	0.012 [0.014]	-0.029 [0.018]	0.098*** [0.017]	-0.042*** [0.015]	-0.111** [0.048]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.086*** [0.015]	0.019 [0.017]	0.177*** [0.019]	0.079*** [0.016]	0.139*** [0.018]	-0.031* [0.018]	0.124*** [0.017]	0.552*** [0.054]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0584	0.0572	0.0707	0.0743	0.044	0.0742	0.0783	0.138
Log Likelihood	-6424	-7225	-3476	-2823	-3680	-3319	-2988	---

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; includes respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Helps Prices", "Trade Helps Prices China", "Trade Helps Prices Cheaper", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 0a is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Column 0b is an ordered categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that international trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); that in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; while that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Column 0a reports marginal effects from an ordered logit regression, on the predicted probability the respondent indicated "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree"; Column 0b reports marginal effects from an ordered logit regression, on the predicted probability the respondent indicated "Somewhat good" or "Extremely good"; Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 6
End-of-Survey Recollection of Treatment Information
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Sample: "Control" and Jobs treatments	(1) Info received on jobs? Logit	(2) Info received on prices? Logit	Sample: "Control" and Prices treatments	(3) Info received on jobs? Logit	(4) Info received on prices? Logit
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.120*** [0.021]	-0.030 [0.020]	Trade Helps Prices	-0.050*** [0.018]	0.145*** [0.022]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.129*** [0.020]	-0.063*** [0.021]	Trade Helps Prices China	-0.047** [0.020]	0.130*** [0.022]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.161*** [0.022]	-0.057*** [0.022]	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	-0.066*** [0.020]	0.167*** [0.023]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.157*** [0.024]	-0.073*** [0.021]	Tariff Hurts Prices	-0.069*** [0.019]	0.141*** [0.021]
Info randomization order	-0.044*** [0.012]	-0.020 [0.014]	Info randomization order	-0.020 [0.016]	-0.021 [0.017]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	0.016 [0.016]	0.030 [0.019]	Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	0.037*** [0.018]	0.012 [0.020]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.047*** [0.017]	-0.003 [0.020]	Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.040** [0.020]	0.019 [0.020]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y
Observations	5,558	5,558	Observations	5,562	5,562
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0348	0.0196	(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0419	0.0345
Log Likelihood	-3645	-3728	Log Likelihood	-3113	-3653

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; Columns 1-2 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while Columns 3-4 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent indicated the information received during the survey was on the relationship between trade and jobs, while that in Columns 2 and 4 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent indicated the information received was on the relationship between trade and prices. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. In Columns 1 and 3 (respectively, Columns 2 and 4), the "Info randomization order" variable is the rank order in which "about jobs" (respectively, "about prices") appeared in the answer options to the respondent in question. All columns report marginal effects from logit regressions; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 7
Exploring the Role of Attention Paid to the Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)
Sample: "Control" and Jobs treatments	Info recall correct? Logit	First principal component OLS	Sample: "Control" and Prices treatments	Info recall correct? Logit	First principal component OLS
Above-median treatment duration	0.124*** [0.017]	0.164** [0.078]	Above-median treatment duration	0.136*** [0.015]	0.022 [0.082]
Trade Hurts Jobs		0.237*** [0.073]	Trade Helps Prices		0.131* [0.074]
Trade Helps Jobs		0.173** [0.075]	Trade Helps Prices China		0.120 [0.075]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs		0.277*** [0.083]	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper		0.159** [0.076]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs		0.357*** [0.076]	Tariff Hurts Prices		0.172** [0.069]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Above-median treatment duration		0.012 [0.108]	Trade Helps Prices × Above-median treatment duration		-0.059 [0.111]
Trade Helps Jobs × Above-median treatment duration		-0.255** [0.106]	Trade Helps Prices China × Above-median treatment duration		0.154 [0.120]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs × Above-median treatment duration		-0.302** [0.118]	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper × Above-median treatment duration		-0.058 [0.121]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs × Above-median treatment duration		-0.221** [0.112]	Tariff Hurts Prices × Above-median treatment duration		-0.126 [0.114]
Most Pref., Randomization Order		-0.026*** [0.007]	Most Pref., Randomization Order		-0.018** [0.008]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	-0.014 [0.019]	-0.048 [0.044]	Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	-0.014 [0.018]	-0.110** [0.048]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.014 [0.021]	0.711*** [0.049]	Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	-0.002 [0.020]	0.552*** [0.054]
p-value: Main + Interaction Effect = 0			p-value: Main + Interaction Effect = 0		
Trade Hurts Jobs		[0.001]	Trade Helps Prices		[0.338]
Trade Helps Jobs		[0.280]	Trade Helps Prices China		[0.003]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs		[0.768]	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper		[0.276]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs		[0.071]	Tariff Hurts Prices		[0.578]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y
Observations	5,558	5,558	Observations	5,562	5,562
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0347	0.166	(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0364	0.139
Log Likelihood	-3606	---	Log Likelihood	-3708	---

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; Columns 1-2 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while Columns 3-4 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent correctly identified the nature of the information received in the survey ("about jobs", "about prices", "none"), while that in Columns 2 and 4 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The "Above-median treatment duration" variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent spent an above-median duration on the information treatment screen page relative to all respondents who received the same information treatment. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Columns 1 and 3 report marginal effects from logit regressions; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Columns 2 and 4 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 8
Exploring Mechanisms: Economic Self-Interest, Social Concerns
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
	Economic Self-Interest			Sociotropic concerns		
Respondent variable:	Employed in Manuf.	ADH 2000s China Shock Exposure	Education: Less than College	Inequality in the US a problem?	Trust in Government	Dissatisfied with US job market?
Panel A: Jobs Treatments	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.243*** [0.075]	0.177* [0.094]	0.228** [0.095]	0.182 [0.118]	0.519*** [0.159]	0.165* [0.098]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.166** [0.076]	0.131 [0.095]	0.241** [0.094]	0.160 [0.138]	0.309* [0.162]	0.215** [0.098]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.265*** [0.087]	0.210* [0.112]	0.276** [0.117]	0.256* [0.140]	0.521*** [0.172]	0.236** [0.106]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.350*** [0.078]	0.301*** [0.105]	0.405*** [0.103]	0.281** [0.137]	0.409*** [0.145]	0.280*** [0.105]
Respondent variable	0.138 [0.131]	-0.009 [0.017]	0.046 [0.079]	-0.201*** [0.040]	0.096*** [0.034]	-0.261*** [0.084]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Respondent Variable	-0.036 [0.189]	0.024 [0.025]	0.012 [0.104]	0.021 [0.050]	-0.103** [0.048]	0.103 [0.120]
Trade Helps Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.079 [0.172]	0.017 [0.023]	-0.108 [0.097]	0.006 [0.057]	-0.052 [0.046]	-0.084 [0.115]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.115 [0.211]	0.026 [0.027]	-0.000 [0.126]	0.000 [0.059]	-0.090* [0.052]	0.055 [0.114]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.091 [0.196]	0.022 [0.025]	-0.078 [0.109]	0.035 [0.057]	-0.025 [0.043]	0.106 [0.138]
Observations	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558
R-squared	0.166	0.166	0.166	0.180	0.168	0.172
Panel B: Prices Treatments	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Trade Helps Prices	0.139* [0.077]	0.148 [0.098]	0.228** [0.100]	0.209 [0.128]	0.076 [0.157]	0.131 [0.095]
Trade Helps Prices China	0.118 [0.077]	0.143 [0.100]	0.277*** [0.098]	0.138 [0.138]	0.274* [0.162]	0.085 [0.103]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	0.153** [0.078]	0.156 [0.117]	0.199* [0.109]	0.153 [0.150]	0.114 [0.164]	0.150 [0.102]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.162** [0.071]	0.208** [0.092]	0.233*** [0.084]	0.026 [0.133]	0.128 [0.135]	0.128 [0.096]
Respondent variable	0.140 [0.135]	-0.004 [0.018]	0.030 [0.078]	-0.197*** [0.038]	0.109*** [0.031]	-0.261*** [0.083]
Trade Helps Prices × Respondent Variable	-0.093 [0.169]	-0.007 [0.025]	-0.163 [0.104]	-0.036 [0.054]	0.011 [0.044]	-0.035 [0.102]
Trade Helps Prices China × Respondent Variable	0.035 [0.203]	-0.009 [0.024]	-0.252** [0.108]	-0.015 [0.057]	-0.059 [0.047]	0.048 [0.126]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper × Respondent Variable	0.069 [0.184]	0.001 [0.036]	-0.073 [0.126]	-0.007 [0.063]	0.015 [0.052]	-0.012 [0.126]
Tariff Hurts Prices × Respondent Variable	0.117 [0.173]	-0.014 [0.025]	-0.107 [0.103]	0.074 [0.055]	0.010 [0.043]	0.057 [0.107]
Observations	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562
R-squared	0.139	0.139	0.140	0.154	0.146	0.146
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Above-median treatment duration & interactions with treatment dummies?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; the Panel A regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while the Panel B regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes; all columns also control for dummy variables for the party supported in the 2016 presidential election, the randomization order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the Most Preferred policy question, as well as the above-median treatment duration variable and its interactions with each treatment dummy. All columns are OLS regressions, that include the main and interaction effects of the respondent variables listed in the respective Column headings. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 9
Exploring Mechanisms: Identity Politics, Loss Aversion
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade				
	Identity Politics			Loss Aversion	
Respondent variable:	Republican Support 2016	Democrat Support 2016	Rep. Support & follow right-leaning news	Dem. Support & follow left-leaning news	No Fees vs. Discount
Panel A: Jobs Treatments	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.216*** [0.080]	0.340*** [0.085]	0.210*** [0.077]	0.260*** [0.077]	0.149 [0.153]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.109 [0.079]	0.234*** [0.090]	0.119 [0.077]	0.190** [0.080]	0.046 [0.145]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.208** [0.087]	0.347*** [0.099]	0.222*** [0.085]	0.296*** [0.085]	0.241 [0.156]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.262*** [0.083]	0.443*** [0.093]	0.280*** [0.081]	0.395*** [0.079]	0.355** [0.158]
Respondent variable	0.563*** [0.086]	0.100 [0.073]	-0.083 [0.118]	0.073 [0.130]	0.013 [0.030]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.066 [0.112]	-0.234** [0.093]	0.096 [0.114]	-0.156 [0.161]	0.027 [0.040]
Trade Helps Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.201* [0.114]	-0.137 [0.100]	0.197* [0.119]	-0.108 [0.142]	0.038 [0.040]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.213* [0.120]	-0.161 [0.106]	0.195 [0.125]	-0.117 [0.167]	0.012 [0.040]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.300*** [0.116]	-0.199* [0.105]	0.280** [0.122]	-0.278* [0.152]	0.001 [0.041]
Observations	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558
R-squared	0.167	0.167	0.167	0.166	0.167
Panel B: Prices Treatments	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade Helps Prices	0.113 [0.081]	0.219** [0.092]	0.096 [0.079]	0.163** [0.080]	-0.087 [0.148]
Trade Helps Prices China	0.077 [0.081]	0.213** [0.091]	0.066 [0.080]	0.140* [0.079]	0.037 [0.157]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	0.207** [0.084]	0.204** [0.093]	0.184** [0.080]	0.181** [0.079]	-0.135 [0.160]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.112 [0.074]	0.261*** [0.086]	0.113 [0.074]	0.205*** [0.074]	0.036 [0.141]
Respondent variable	0.499*** [0.091]	0.035 [0.075]	0.097 [0.122]	0.317** [0.130]	0.015 [0.030]
Trade Helps Prices × Respondent Variable	0.053 [0.118]	-0.200* [0.103]	0.122 [0.118]	-0.204 [0.155]	0.066* [0.037]
Trade Helps Prices China × Respondent Variable	0.131 [0.119]	-0.212** [0.100]	0.196 [0.125]	-0.091 [0.152]	0.026 [0.044]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper × Respondent Variable	-0.140 [0.127]	-0.100 [0.111]	-0.084 [0.129]	-0.138 [0.153]	0.095** [0.044]
Tariff Hurts Prices × Respondent Variable	0.182 [0.111]	-0.205** [0.100]	0.222* [0.116]	-0.202 [0.142]	0.042 [0.038]
Observations	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562
R-squared	0.140	0.140	0.141	0.140	0.144
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Above-median treatment duration & interactions with treatment dummies?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; the Panel A regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while the Panel B regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes; all columns also control for dummy variables for the party supported in the 2016 presidential election, the randomization order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the Most Preferred policy question, as well as the above-median treatment duration variable and its interactions with each treatment dummy. All columns are OLS regressions, that include the main and interaction effects of the respondent variables listed in the respective Column headings. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 10
Reasons for Picking More Limits on Imports as a Most Preferred Policy

Dependent variable: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Not persuaded	Imports often lower quality	Imports often compete for US jobs	Imports potential threat to National security	Concerned about imports from China	Other more important concerns
	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Trade Hurts Jobs	---	-0.026 [0.037]	0.089** [0.045]	0.014 [0.030]	-0.027 [0.049]	0.056 [0.039]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.014 [0.034]	0.027 [0.043]	0.071 [0.055]	0.055 [0.037]	0.122** [0.061]	0.021 [0.036]
Trade Helps Prices	-0.077** [0.032]	-0.025 [0.039]	0.025 [0.049]	-0.033 [0.023]	-0.027 [0.047]	0.102*** [0.038]
Trade Helps Prices China	-0.032 [0.031]	-0.007 [0.042]	0.087* [0.051]	0.053* [0.032]	0.029 [0.048]	0.033 [0.036]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	-0.020 [0.033]	0.009 [0.039]	0.064 [0.048]	0.008 [0.032]	0.071 [0.056]	0.025 [0.035]
Tariff Hurts Prices	-0.070* [0.036]	-0.067 [0.041]	-0.010 [0.048]	0.017 [0.032]	0.065 [0.054]	0.005 [0.033]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	876	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0297	0.0451	0.0753	0.0393	0.0776	0.0451
Log Likelihood	-1231	-1350	-1215	-1384	-1202	-1270

Notes: The regression sample comprises respondents in Round 3 (2021) who received an information treatment and also selected "More limits on imports" as a top three "Most preferred" policy out of the list of eight policies; the omitted category is the subset of these respondents who received either the "Trade Hurts Helps" or "Trade Helps Hurts" treatments. The dependent variable in each column is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the respective reasons for selecting "More limits on imports", with 1 being "Strongly Disagree" and 5 being "Strongly Agree". The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, together with a reason randomization order variable. The marginal effects reported in each column are for the predicted probability the respondent indicated "Strongly Agree"; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 11
Respondent Characteristics and Concern about Imports from China

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Trade Helps Jobs	0.125** [0.060]	0.125** [0.061]	0.136** [0.062]	0.135** [0.061]
Dissatisfied with US job market	0.071** [0.031]	0.051 [0.033]	0.071** [0.031]	0.072** [0.031]
Trade Helps Jobs × Dissatisfied with US job market		0.215* [0.112]		
High trust in government	-0.052* [0.031]	-0.054* [0.031]	-0.033 [0.032]	-0.045 [0.031]
Trade Helps Jobs × High trust in government			-0.200** [0.101]	
Supported Democrat 2016	0.098** [0.044]	0.101** [0.044]	0.099** [0.044]	0.089* [0.047]
Trade Helps Jobs × Supported Democrat 2016				0.128 [0.129]
Supported Republican 2016	0.144*** [0.040]	0.145*** [0.040]	0.140*** [0.040]	0.125*** [0.042]
Trade Helps Jobs × Supported Republican 2016				0.232** [0.111]
Trade Hurts Jobs	-0.029 [0.048]	-0.029 [0.048]	-0.029 [0.048]	-0.029 [0.048]
Trade Helps Prices	-0.029 [0.047]	-0.029 [0.047]	-0.028 [0.047]	-0.028 [0.047]
Trade Helps Prices China	0.040 [0.048]	0.039 [0.047]	0.041 [0.047]	0.041 [0.048]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	0.085 [0.057]	0.082 [0.057]	0.085 [0.057]	0.083 [0.056]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.066 [0.054]	0.064 [0.054]	0.064 [0.054]	0.065 [0.054]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0796	0.0813	0.0811	0.0808
Log Likelihood	-1200	-1198	-1198	-1198

Notes: The regression sample comprises respondents in Round 3 (2021) who received an information treatment and also selected "More limits on imports" as a top three "Most preferred" policy out of the list of eight policies; the omitted category is the subset of these respondents who received either the "Trade Hurts Helps" or "Trade Helps Hurts" treatments. The dependent variable in each column is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the reason "I am concerned about U.S. imports from countries such as China" for selecting "More limits on imports", with 1 being "Strongly Disagree" and 5 being "Strongly Agree". The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, together with a reason randomization order variable. The marginal effects reported in each column are for the predicted probability the respondent indicated "Strongly Agree"; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 1a
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 1 (2018-2019)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Prices
<u>Biodata</u>				
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.14 [17.11]	48.10 [16.78]	47.82 [17.02]	47.17 [16.19]
Race: White	0.60 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.11 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]
Race: Hispanic	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.28]	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.25]	0.92 [0.27]
<u>Socio-Economic Characteristics</u>				
Household Income: Average \$ (approx.)	56,283.42 [46,165.00]	59,436.49 [49,179.60]	60,356.45 [50,359.88]	56,851.18 [44,589.27]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.84 [4.97]	11.98 [4.87]	11.70 [4.93]	11.73 [4.88]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.11 [0.32]	0.09 [0.28]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.26]	0.08 [0.27]	0.08 [0.27]	0.07 [0.25]
Employment Sector: Services	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.04 [0.20]	0.03 [0.17]	0.03 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]
<u>Baseline Socio-Political Attributes</u>				
Presidential election 2016: Supported Dem.	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Presidential election 2016: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]	0.34 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.07 [0.93]	1.94 [1.01]	2.02 [0.93]	2.01 [0.94]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.42 [1.06]	2.45 [1.10]	2.64 [1.02]	2.51 [1.02]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.46 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.15 [0.89]	3.12 [0.95]	3.18 [0.86]	3.17 [0.88]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.57 [0.49]
<u>News consumption patterns</u>				
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.90 [2.52]	5.11 [2.47]	5.03 [2.45]	5.02 [2.44]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.26 [0.44]	0.31 [0.46]	0.28 [0.45]	0.29 [0.45]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.15 [0.36]	0.14 [0.35]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.38]
<u>Location Characteristics</u>				
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.29 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.58 [1.80]	2.50 [1.66]	2.59 [1.83]	2.56 [2.00]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]	0.17 [0.12]
Urban?	0.89 [0.31]	0.87 [0.34]	0.83 [0.37]	0.84 [0.36]
<u>Survey Characteristics</u>				
Duration to complete (secs.)	594.42 [571.12]	618.62 [405.58]	936.30 [2,682.71]	774.48 [1,323.74]
Treatment duration	---	47.37 [70.26]	45.09 [50.10]	49.66 [74.12]
Mobile device?	0.57 [0.50]	0.57 [0.50]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumption, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 1b
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 2 (2020)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Trade Helps Prices China	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	Tariff Hurts Prices
Biodata									
Gender: Male	0.45 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.55 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.55 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	44.19 [16.46]	44.82 [17.10]	44.41 [16.80]	45.72 [16.69]	47.25 [16.33]	44.24 [16.47]	48.80 [15.52]	46.78 [15.91]	45.30 [16.77]
Race: White	0.69 [0.46]	0.66 [0.47]	0.66 [0.47]	0.69 [0.46]	0.70 [0.46]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]
Race: African-American	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.16 [0.37]	0.10 [0.30]	0.11 [0.31]	0.12 [0.32]
Race: Hispanic	0.11 [0.32]	0.14 [0.35]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.32]	0.10 [0.30]	0.13 [0.34]	0.17 [0.38]	0.18 [0.38]	0.13 [0.34]
Born in US?	0.93 [0.25]	0.93 [0.26]	0.93 [0.26]	0.92 [0.27]	0.94 [0.24]	0.92 [0.28]	0.90 [0.30]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.28]
Socio-Economic Characteristics									
Household Income: Average \$ (approx.)	66,730.47 [54,552.62]	64,924.91 [54,109.28]	63,860.76 [54,598.14]	64,574.47 [52,423.46]	63,369.57 [50,601.55]	64,826.30 [54,619.81]	63,650.96 [54,415.55]	64,824.95 [55,511.69]	66,645.57 [55,265.93]
Education: Average years (approx.)	12.11 [4.83]	11.63 [4.90]	11.71 [4.79]	11.66 [4.73]	11.48 [4.85]	11.73 [4.82]	10.96 [4.92]	10.68 [4.93]	11.54 [4.90]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.36 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.42 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.15 [0.36]	0.12 [0.32]	0.12 [0.32]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]	0.13 [0.33]	0.10 [0.30]
Employment Status: Employed	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.08 [0.28]	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.28]	0.08 [0.27]	0.09 [0.28]	0.11 [0.31]
Employment Sector: Services	0.37 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]	0.38 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.38 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]
Student?	0.04 [0.19]	0.05 [0.22]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.21]	0.04 [0.20]	0.05 [0.21]	0.03 [0.17]	0.02 [0.14]	0.05 [0.21]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.08 [1.46]	3.11 [1.47]	3.23 [1.44]	3.06 [1.52]	3.02 [1.46]	3.16 [1.45]	3.10 [1.56]	3.11 [1.48]	3.11 [1.46]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes									
Presidential election 2016: Supported Dem.	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Presidential election 2016: Supported Rep.	0.37 [0.48]	0.34 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.33 [0.47]	0.37 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	1.93 [0.95]	1.81 [0.95]	1.97 [0.94]	1.83 [0.98]	1.93 [0.91]	1.98 [0.93]	2.01 [0.96]	2.07 [0.95]	1.98 [0.94]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.78 [1.13]	2.79 [1.13]	2.81 [1.14]	2.78 [1.10]	2.83 [1.17]	2.82 [1.12]	2.79 [1.16]	2.69 [1.15]	2.76 [1.12]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.34 [0.47]	0.37 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.33 [0.47]	0.33 [0.47]	0.37 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.40 [0.91]	3.34 [0.86]	3.34 [0.94]	3.35 [0.92]	3.34 [0.86]	3.42 [0.87]	3.29 [0.95]	3.33 [0.90]	3.32 [0.89]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.65 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.68 [0.47]	0.64 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]
News consumption patterns									
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.41 [2.26]	5.24 [2.38]	5.16 [2.45]	5.37 [2.28]	5.54 [2.17]	5.35 [2.28]	5.33 [2.36]	5.19 [2.39]	5.14 [2.41]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.24 [0.43]	0.29 [0.45]	0.24 [0.43]	0.25 [0.43]	0.28 [0.45]	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]	0.22 [0.41]	0.26 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.22 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.22 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.19 [0.39]	0.20 [0.40]	0.21 [0.41]	0.23 [0.42]	0.20 [0.40]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.20 [0.40]	0.17 [0.38]	0.19 [0.39]	0.16 [0.37]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.36]	0.17 [0.38]
Location Characteristics									
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.32 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.32 [0.12]	0.30 [0.12]	0.32 [0.12]	0.32 [0.12]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.59 [2.03]	2.46 [1.91]	2.67 [1.92]	2.61 [2.33]	2.68 [1.89]	2.51 [2.19]	2.55 [2.34]	2.51 [1.79]	2.57 [2.06]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.12]	0.15 [0.11]	0.16 [0.12]	0.16 [0.12]	0.15 [0.11]
Urban?	0.89 [0.31]	0.88 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.88 [0.32]	0.87 [0.34]	0.87 [0.33]	0.84 [0.36]	0.89 [0.31]	0.88 [0.33]
Survey Characteristics									
Duration to complete (secs.)	883.20 [1,824.82]	871.98 [1,212.07]	950.91 [2,352.46]	775.22 [726.87]	828.80 [1,126.14]	1,034.13 [4,730.93]	1,003.23 [2,240.11]	854.07 [737.14]	923.56 [1,274.47]
Treatment duration	7.18 [9.92]	25.85 [78.42]	32.97 [96.27]	34.07 [46.23]	33.22 [42.31]	32.31 [165.47]	30.54 [60.17]	28.30 [54.81]	26.29 [43.88]
Mobile device?	0.71 [0.46]	0.71 [0.46]	0.69 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]	0.66 [0.48]	0.70 [0.46]	0.72 [0.45]	0.77 [0.42]	0.68 [0.47]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumption, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 1c
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 3 (2021)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Trade Helps Prices China	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	Tariff Hurts Prices
<u>Biodata</u>									
Gender: Male	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.54 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	45.53 [17.23]	45.91 [16.49]	46.29 [16.50]	46.76 [16.15]	47.44 [16.77]	47.19 [16.97]	46.20 [16.43]	47.65 [16.57]	45.96 [17.10]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.61 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.12 [0.33]	0.10 [0.30]
Race: Hispanic	0.16 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]	0.18 [0.39]	0.18 [0.38]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.37]	0.20 [0.40]	0.19 [0.39]	0.17 [0.37]
Born in US?	0.90 [0.30]	0.91 [0.28]	0.91 [0.29]	0.91 [0.29]	0.89 [0.31]	0.94 [0.24]	0.92 [0.28]	0.93 [0.26]	0.92 [0.27]
<u>Socio-Economic Characteristics</u>									
Household Income: Average \$ (approx.)	61,560.36 [50,470.53]	61,931.82 [48,021.40]	60,962.88 [46,445.15]	59,767.44 [49,064.13]	60,990.89 [48,759.59]	66,471.96 [54,351.03]	63,181.82 [49,566.35]	58,789.95 [46,745.54]	64,455.78 [51,311.65]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.83 [4.89]	11.57 [4.87]	11.89 [4.82]	11.72 [4.80]	11.95 [4.90]	11.52 [4.98]	11.43 [4.89]	11.57 [4.89]	11.86 [4.83]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.42 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.34 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.44 [0.50]	0.37 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.09 [0.29]	0.11 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]	0.13 [0.33]	0.10 [0.30]	0.08 [0.28]	0.11 [0.31]	0.09 [0.29]	0.10 [0.30]
Employment Status: Employed	0.49 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.26]	0.07 [0.26]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.28]	0.06 [0.23]	0.07 [0.26]	0.08 [0.27]	0.08 [0.27]	0.05 [0.21]
Employment Sector: Services	0.38 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.06 [0.24]	0.02 [0.15]	0.04 [0.21]	0.02 [0.16]	0.04 [0.18]	0.05 [0.21]	0.03 [0.17]	0.05 [0.22]	0.05 [0.22]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.14 [1.48]	3.16 [1.48]	3.17 [1.55]	2.97 [1.49]	2.93 [1.45]	3.07 [1.51]	3.08 [1.47]	3.06 [1.52]	3.08 [1.52]
<u>Baseline Socio-Political Attributes</u>									
Presidential election 2016: Supported Dem.	0.43 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]	0.43 [0.50]	0.41 [0.49]	0.44 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]	0.38 [0.49]	0.43 [0.50]	0.43 [0.50]
Presidential election 2016: Supported Rep.	0.33 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.30 [0.46]	0.36 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	1.94 [1.01]	1.97 [0.98]	2.00 [0.95]	2.02 [0.94]	1.93 [0.98]	2.01 [0.92]	1.93 [0.95]	1.94 [0.97]	2.03 [0.92]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.66 [1.11]	2.69 [1.16]	2.63 [1.07]	2.59 [1.10]	2.73 [1.10]	2.80 [1.16]	2.69 [1.08]	2.61 [1.11]	2.77 [1.10]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.37 [0.48]	0.42 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.30 [0.88]	3.32 [0.92]	3.28 [0.90]	3.30 [0.83]	3.28 [0.87]	3.40 [0.88]	3.33 [0.85]	3.23 [0.85]	3.33 [0.85]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.61 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.66 [0.47]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]
<u>News consumption patterns</u>									
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.94 [2.45]	4.90 [2.45]	4.88 [2.49]	4.85 [2.49]	5.05 [2.45]	5.25 [2.31]	5.10 [2.32]	5.09 [2.46]	4.99 [2.47]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]	0.24 [0.43]	0.23 [0.42]	0.27 [0.44]	0.27 [0.44]	0.25 [0.44]	0.25 [0.44]	0.24 [0.43]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.20 [0.40]	0.19 [0.39]	0.19 [0.40]	0.22 [0.42]	0.21 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.17 [0.38]	0.19 [0.39]	0.21 [0.41]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.36]	0.15 [0.36]	0.13 [0.34]	0.14 [0.35]	0.17 [0.38]	0.13 [0.34]	0.14 [0.35]
<u>Location Characteristics</u>									
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.47 [1.68]	2.46 [1.60]	2.50 [1.60]	2.55 [1.84]	2.53 [1.82]	2.63 [1.98]	2.50 [1.77]	2.64 [1.75]	2.57 [1.84]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.10]	0.17 [0.12]	0.17 [0.12]
Urban?	0.88 [0.33]	0.88 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.86 [0.34]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]	0.85 [0.36]
<u>Survey Characteristics</u>									
Duration to complete (secs.)	881.40 [852.88]	873.19 [1,105.63]	859.28 [846.05]	955.85 [949.42]	891.58 [806.58]	900.98 [671.81]	922.50 [1,959.10]	846.99 [621.00]	857.29 [601.25]
Treatment duration	4.23 [8.16]	26.21 [30.28]	29.60 [46.75]	40.50 [63.10]	38.47 [97.34]	31.16 [56.05]	25.43 [31.87]	31.31 [52.14]	29.19 [79.05]
Mobile device?	0.60 [0.49]	0.57 [0.50]	0.62 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.57 [0.49]	0.54 [0.50]	0.57 [0.50]	0.56 [0.50]	0.57 [0.49]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumption, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Appendix Table 2
Full Results for the Baseline Treatment Effects
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Dependent Variable:	(1) First principal component OLS	(2) First principal component OLS
Treatment dummies: (Omitted: Control group)		
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.245*** [0.049]	
Trade Helps Jobs	0.047 [0.053]	
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.123** [0.060]	
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.243*** [0.050]	
Trade Helps Prices		0.101** [0.050]
Trade Helps Prices China		0.199*** [0.057]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper		0.132** [0.059]
Tariff Hurts Prices		0.109** [0.050]
Individual Controls:		
Gender (Omitted: Male)		
Female	-0.042 [0.039]	-0.024 [0.039]
Other	-0.325 [0.266]	-0.152 [0.225]
Age (Omitted: 18-24)		
25-34	0.077 [0.053]	0.128** [0.058]
35-44	0.302*** [0.068]	0.316*** [0.067]
45-54	0.434*** [0.065]	0.386*** [0.065]
55-64	0.505*** [0.075]	0.547*** [0.079]
Above 65	0.697*** [0.083]	0.753*** [0.081]
Race (Omitted: White)		
African-American	-0.013 [0.057]	0.031 [0.058]
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish Origin	-0.012 [0.051]	-0.003 [0.058]
Asian	-0.100 [0.082]	-0.095 [0.087]
Other	0.071 [0.089]	-0.004 [0.107]
Education: College and above?	-0.015 [0.041]	0.084* [0.045]
Household Income (Omitted: \$0-\$49,999)		
\$50,000-\$99,999	0.007 [0.045]	0.087** [0.043]
\$100,000-\$150,000	0.066 [0.067]	0.106* [0.063]
\$150,000-\$200,000	0.170* [0.095]	0.264*** [0.094]
>\$200,000	0.097 [0.099]	0.118 [0.103]
Unsure	-0.332*** [0.081]	-0.092 [0.085]
Employment Status (Omitted: Not in labor force)		
Not employed, looking for work	-0.008 [0.062]	0.002 [0.062]
Student	0.062 [0.085]	0.103 [0.084]
Employed, in Agriculture	0.235** [0.096]	0.356*** [0.103]
Employed, in Mining	0.390*** [0.113]	0.275** [0.126]
Employed, in Manufacturing	0.180** [0.080]	0.161** [0.075]
Employed, in Services	0.091* [0.053]	0.057 [0.046]
Responded on Mobile Device?	0.170*** [0.040]	0.187*** [0.044]
Presidential Election 2016 (Omitted: Neither)		
Supported Democrat	-0.054 [0.044]	-0.111** [0.048]
Supported Republican	0.709*** [0.049]	0.552*** [0.054]
Frequency following news (Omitted: < once a week)		
1-2 times a week	0.158** [0.072]	0.046 [0.073]
3-6 times a week	0.196*** [0.061]	0.083 [0.070]
Daily	0.224*** [0.061]	0.035 [0.068]

Main News Source (Omitted: Broadcast TV news)		
CNN/BBC	-0.066 [0.051]	-0.172*** [0.050]
Fox News	0.318*** [0.056]	0.394*** [0.058]
Local TV news station	0.083* [0.050]	0.076 [0.052]
News/Evening News/Other program source	-0.020 [0.053]	-0.051 [0.062]
Region of Birth (Omitted: New England)		
Mideast	0.083 [0.100]	0.189* [0.106]
Great Lakes	0.150 [0.099]	0.193* [0.100]
Plains	-0.008 [0.122]	0.118 [0.111]
Southeast	0.037 [0.096]	0.156 [0.096]
Southwest	0.019 [0.104]	0.152 [0.110]
Rocky Mountain	-0.161 [0.153]	-0.109 [0.139]
Far West	-0.007 [0.095]	0.147 [0.104]
Others or Missing	0.167 [0.240]	0.096 [0.232]
Not born in US	-0.092 [0.112]	-0.005 [0.112]
County Controls:		
Share with college education (age>=25)	-0.457** [0.189]	-0.250 [0.284]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	0.009 [0.010]	-0.012 [0.008]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.353* [0.194]	0.142 [0.209]
Urban?	0.012 [0.063]	-0.046 [0.067]
County characteristics filled?	0.054 [0.061]	0.044 [0.118]
Round-Week Dummies: (Omitted: Round 2, Week 1)		
Round 2, Week 2	-0.308 [0.213]	-0.454* [0.260]
Round 2, Week 3	-0.381* [0.229]	-0.567** [0.287]
Round 2, Week 4	-0.181 [0.214]	-0.538** [0.253]
Round 2, Week 5	-0.352 [0.232]	-0.579** [0.262]
Round 3, Week 1	-0.385 [0.360]	-0.782** [0.304]
Round 3, Week 2	-0.260 [0.212]	-0.592** [0.263]
Round 3, Week 3	-0.263 [0.216]	-0.504* [0.262]
Round 3, Week 4	-0.367 [0.234]	-0.679** [0.299]
Round 3, Week 5	-0.075 [0.317]	-0.290 [0.326]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.025*** [0.007]	-0.017** [0.008]
Constant Term	-0.685*** [0.259]	-0.389 [0.277]
Observations	5,558	5,562
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.163	0.138

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. All columns report OLS estimates; Column 1 reports the full set of coefficients from the Table 4, Column 6 specification, while Column 2 reports the full set of coefficients from the Table 5, Column 6 specification. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 3
Robustness: Alternative Samples and Constructions of the Dependent Variable

Trade Policy Questions:	<i>First Principal Component</i>	<i>First Principal Component</i>	<i>First Principal Component</i>	<i>First Principal Component</i>	<i>Unweighted Average</i>	<i>Dummy: 3 or more protectionist responses</i>	<i>Factor Analysis</i>
Survey Rounds:	2	3	1, 2 & 3	2 & 3, Info recall correct	2 & 3	2 & 3	2 & 3
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.173*** [0.062]	0.372*** [0.084]	0.253*** [0.042]	0.636*** [0.101]	0.051*** [0.010]	0.079*** [0.018]	0.133*** [0.027]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.033 [0.065]	0.061 [0.083]	0.062 [0.048]	0.312*** [0.103]	0.009 [0.011]	0.017 [0.019]	0.025 [0.029]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.113 [0.080]	0.154* [0.088]	0.128** [0.059]	0.392*** [0.106]	0.025** [0.013]	0.046** [0.021]	0.066** [0.032]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.177** [0.070]	0.325*** [0.083]	0.255*** [0.049]	0.490*** [0.108]	0.050*** [0.011]	0.086*** [0.019]	0.133*** [0.027]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.020** [0.009]	-0.028** [0.012]	-0.020*** [0.006]	-0.039*** [0.012]	-0.005*** [0.001]	-0.009*** [0.003]	-0.013*** [0.004]
Observations	3,303	2,255	7,266	2,210	5,558	5,558	5,558
R-squared	0.168	0.188	0.162	0.189	0.156	0.123	0.165
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Trade Helps Prices	0.067 [0.063]	0.154* [0.090]	0.126*** [0.044]	0.317*** [0.094]	0.019* [0.010]	0.029 [0.018]	0.056** [0.027]
Trade Helps Prices China	0.231*** [0.078]	0.147* [0.084]	0.211*** [0.056]	0.488*** [0.101]	0.041*** [0.012]	0.049** [0.020]	0.107*** [0.031]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	0.093 [0.085]	0.162* [0.088]	0.140** [0.057]	0.395*** [0.104]	0.027** [0.012]	0.057*** [0.020]	0.072** [0.032]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.119* [0.070]	0.084 [0.083]	0.119** [0.048]	0.338*** [0.097]	0.021** [0.010]	0.031* [0.018]	0.059** [0.027]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.017* [0.009]	-0.019 [0.012]	-0.012 [0.007]	-0.015 [0.011]	-0.004** [0.002]	-0.006** [0.003]	-0.009** [0.004]
Observations	3,305	2,257	6,718	2,929	5,562	5,562	5,562
R-squared	0.154	0.136	0.140	0.168	0.136	0.100	0.137
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Based on the survey samples indicated in the respective column headings; the Panel A regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while the Panel B regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is the first principal component measure constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 5 is an unweighted average measure; that in Column 6 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a response favoring protectionism was given on at least three of the five component questions; and that in Column 7 is the principal factor from a factor analysis of the component measures. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 4
Robustness: Controlling for Covid Mobility and Black Lives Matter Events
(Round 2, 2020 only)

Sample: "Control" and Jobs treatments	(1) First principal component OLS	(2) First principal component OLS	Sample: "Control" and Prices treatments	(3) First principal component OLS	(4) First principal component OLS
Indicator: Above Median Safegraph Mobility	-0.004 [0.057]		Indicator: Above Median Safegraph Mobility	-0.041 [0.061]	
Indicator: BLM Events		0.067 [0.092]	Indicator: BLM Events		0.015 [0.074]
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.158** [0.064]	0.175*** [0.063]	Trade Helps Prices	0.043 [0.064]	0.067 [0.063]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.029 [0.066]	0.035 [0.065]	Trade Helps Prices China	0.224*** [0.081]	0.231*** [0.078]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.092 [0.081]	0.114 [0.080]	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	0.100 [0.087]	0.093 [0.085]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.181** [0.072]	0.178** [0.071]	Tariff Hurts Prices	0.094 [0.072]	0.119* [0.070]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.021** [0.009]	-0.020** [0.009]	Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.015 [0.009]	-0.017* [0.009]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	-0.173*** [0.056]	-0.155*** [0.055]	Pres. Election 2016: Supported Democrat	-0.062 [0.061]	-0.058 [0.061]
Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.618*** [0.064]	0.626*** [0.062]	Pres. Election 2016: Supported Republican	0.617*** [0.072]	0.605*** [0.070]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y
Observations	3,152	3,303	Observations	3,173	3,305
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.172	0.168	(Pseudo) R-squared	0.160	0.154

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) survey sample; Columns 1-2 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while Columns 3-4 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 5
Exploring Mechanisms: Additional Results on Economic Self-Interest, Social Concerns
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade							
	Economic Self-Interest				Sociotropic concerns			
Respondent variable:	Household inc. <\$50,000	Unemployed	ADH 1990s China Shock Exposure	Bad Impact of NAFTA on Family	Job gives a sense of identity	Willing to pay more for US brand	Trust in foreigners	Disagree children will have a better life
Panel A: Jobs Treatments	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.167* [0.087]	0.252*** [0.074]	0.276*** [0.094]	0.274* [0.166]	0.265*** [0.090]	0.235*** [0.091]	0.065 [0.154]	-0.013 [0.136]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.143 [0.088]	0.198*** [0.075]	0.133 [0.096]	0.270* [0.161]	0.166* [0.089]	0.161* [0.086]	-0.144 [0.175]	0.082 [0.139]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.197* [0.104]	0.292*** [0.088]	0.263** [0.117]	0.107 [0.214]	0.330*** [0.102]	0.257*** [0.098]	0.220 [0.197]	0.108 [0.164]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.283*** [0.095]	0.348*** [0.077]	0.391*** [0.103]	0.310* [0.185]	0.408*** [0.093]	0.230** [0.100]	-0.024 [0.169]	0.382*** [0.146]
Respondent variable	0.236** [0.105]	0.075 [0.113]	0.002 [0.043]	0.051 [0.046]	0.151** [0.072]	0.674*** [0.076]	-0.158*** [0.034]	-0.075** [0.031]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.139 [0.100]	-0.134 [0.151]	-0.037 [0.061]	-0.014 [0.058]	-0.059 [0.105]	0.003 [0.106]	0.056 [0.046]	0.092* [0.048]
Trade Helps Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.058 [0.106]	-0.210 [0.154]	0.035 [0.052]	-0.038 [0.059]	0.010 [0.093]	0.028 [0.099]	0.106** [0.050]	0.032 [0.048]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.162 [0.121]	-0.129 [0.173]	0.014 [0.078]	0.067 [0.075]	-0.115 [0.126]	0.011 [0.107]	0.014 [0.059]	0.060 [0.054]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs × Respondent Variable	0.148 [0.116]	0.087 [0.173]	-0.031 [0.061]	0.018 [0.069]	-0.112 [0.104]	0.171 [0.106]	0.127** [0.051]	-0.013 [0.049]
Observations	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558	5,558
R-squared	0.166	0.166	0.166	0.167	0.167	0.221	0.172	0.168
Panel B: Prices Treatments	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Trade Helps Prices	0.163* [0.090]	0.127* [0.074]	0.180* [0.100]	0.195 [0.149]	0.135 [0.096]	0.118 [0.087]	-0.155 [0.177]	0.088 [0.127]
Trade Helps Prices China	0.145* [0.087]	0.118 [0.077]	0.175* [0.096]	0.176 [0.180]	0.140 [0.095]	0.113 [0.098]	0.073 [0.186]	-0.171 [0.144]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper	0.086 [0.094]	0.169** [0.078]	0.203** [0.097]	0.207 [0.190]	0.164* [0.093]	0.202** [0.092]	-0.036 [0.185]	0.169 [0.158]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.157** [0.077]	0.195*** [0.072]	0.204** [0.097]	0.266 [0.172]	0.165* [0.085]	0.122 [0.082]	-0.216 [0.162]	0.092 [0.130]
Respondent variable	0.087 [0.103]	0.051 [0.115]	0.054 [0.045]	0.048 [0.045]	0.160** [0.074]	0.712*** [0.075]	-0.158*** [0.034]	-0.082** [0.033]
Trade Helps Prices × Respondent Variable	-0.063 [0.105]	0.039 [0.179]	-0.042 [0.065]	-0.024 [0.054]	-0.023 [0.103]	-0.021 [0.095]	0.097** [0.049]	0.010 [0.045]
Trade Helps Prices China × Respondent Variable	-0.050 [0.112]	0.017 [0.176]	-0.047 [0.056]	-0.021 [0.068]	-0.041 [0.110]	0.031 [0.118]	0.015 [0.053]	0.107** [0.051]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper × Respondent Variable	0.140 [0.116]	-0.088 [0.175]	-0.038 [0.058]	-0.018 [0.068]	-0.016 [0.113]	-0.076 [0.120]	0.063 [0.058]	-0.003 [0.051]
Tariff Hurts Prices × Respondent Variable	0.028 [0.104]	-0.199 [0.159]	-0.027 [0.065]	-0.036 [0.061]	0.011 [0.101]	0.081 [0.098]	0.129*** [0.045]	0.027 [0.044]
Observations	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562	5,562
R-squared	0.139	0.139	0.139	0.139	0.141	0.195	0.145	0.142
Above median treatment duration & interactions with treatment dummies?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples; the Panel A regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while the Panel B regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes; all columns also control for dummy variables for the party supported in the 2016 presidential election, the randomization order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the Most Preferred policy question, as well as the above median treatment duration variable and its interactions with each treatment dummy. All columns are OLS regressions, that include the main and interaction effects of the respondent variables listed in the respective Column headings. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 6
Reasons for Picking More Limits on Imports as a Most Preferred Policy: Summary Statistics

Reasons: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	Not persuaded	Imports often lower quality	Imports often compete for US jobs	Imports potential threat to National security	Concerned about imports from China	Other more important concerns
<u>Information Treatment received:</u>						
Trade Hurts Jobs (N = 138)	---	3.67 [1.00]	4.11 [0.92]	3.56 [1.04]	3.96 [0.99]	3.84 [0.97]
Trade Helps Jobs (N = 114)	3.63 [1.06]	3.85 [1.03]	4.08 [1.00]	3.72 [1.06]	4.22 [1.03]	3.78 [0.97]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs (N = 133)	3.47 [1.10]	3.64 [1.08]	3.83 [1.02]	3.34 [1.08]	3.97 [1.06]	3.62 [0.95]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs (N = 123)	3.58 [1.04]	3.90 [1.04]	4.03 [1.03]	3.71 [0.91]	4.09 [1.02]	3.82 [0.90]
Trade Helps Prices (N = 122)	3.24 [1.04]	3.71 [0.98]	4.00 [1.01]	3.37 [1.06]	3.95 [1.04]	3.96 [0.92]
Trade Helps Prices China (N = 134)	3.37 [1.05]	3.77 [1.01]	4.04 [1.06]	3.67 [1.00]	4.08 [0.93]	3.77 [0.92]
Trade Helps Prices Cheaper (N = 130)	3.49 [1.04]	3.75 [1.06]	4.08 [0.93]	3.48 [1.11]	4.11 [1.04]	3.76 [1.00]
Tariff Hurts Prices (N = 120)	3.24 [1.12]	3.54 [1.12]	3.89 [1.07]	3.52 [1.06]	4.10 [1.03]	3.68 [1.05]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets. Based on the sample of Round 3 (2021) respondents who received an information treatment and who selected More Limits on Imports as a top three most preferred policy.

Appendix Table 7
Summary Statistics: End-of-Survey Recollection of Treatment Information

	SURVEY: Round 2, 2020 (N=5,926)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)
Share of respondents who said information was about jobs	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]
Share of respondents who said information was about prices	0.52 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Share of respondents who said no information received	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]
Correctly identified nature of information treatment	0.47 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Conditional on receiving a treatment about jobs, correctly identified as such	0.42 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]
Conditional on receiving a treatment about prices, correctly identified as such	0.59 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]
Conditional on receiving no information treatment, correctly identified as such	0.19 [0.39]	0.25 [0.43]

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) and Round 3 (2021) survey samples